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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 42 SUMMER, 1989 NUMBER 2
CHALLENGING DISCRIMINATORY GUESSWORK:
DOES IMPACT ANALYSIS APPLY?
MICHAEL A. MIDDLETON*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (the "Act") is the first major
piece of federal legislation designed to deal comprehensively with the prob-
lem of employment discrimination in the American work place. It prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin and sex
by private and public employers as well as labor organizations and employ-
ment agencies. The two theoretical bases upon which the existence of unlawful
discrimination may be established are disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact. Both are rooted in section 703(a) of the Act.' The disparate treatment
theory,3 the "most easily understood," ' postulates that the employer has in-
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1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-18, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to (e)-17 (1982).
2. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978);
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Hazelwood School District v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
4. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15.
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tentionally treated the plaintiff less favorably than others on a prohibited basis.
Critical to the success of a disparate treatment claim is a showing of
discriminatory intent. By contrast, disparate impact theory5 requires a show-
ing that the defendant, without business justification, utilized employment
practices or procedures that adversely affected the plaintiff as a member of
a protected class.'
The Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact approach in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,7 stating that "good intent or absence of discriminatory in-
tent does not redeem employment procedures ... that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capabil-
ity."' The Court noted that "congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation," and
"placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. ' 9
During the early 1980's, both an intra and inter circuit split developed over
whether the nature of the challenged practice should dictate the mode of
analysis utilized in deciding whether unlawful discrimination under Title VII
has occurred. Specifically, a number of courts held that disparate impact
analysis is only applicable where the employment practice being challenged
can be isolated or is objective or both.'0 In other words, only the disparate
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
6. This article, for purposes of consistency and clarity, discusses discrimination only in terms
of race. The only situation in which the protected status of the plaintiff might make a difference
in analysis would be where the defendant has available to it the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") defense contained in Section 2000e-2(e) of the Act. The BFOQ defense allows an
employer to discriminate on the basis of an individual's protected class status where such discrimina-
tion is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business. See Western Airlines v. Criswell,
472 U.S. 400 (1985). The availability of this defense in sex, religion and national origin based
challenges, however, has no significance in determining which analytical approach is appropriate
in deciding the ultimate question whether discrimination exists. The BFOQ defense is not available
in race discrimination claims.
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact analysis had, of course, been utilized by lower
courts before Griggs. See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968);
Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970).
8. 401 U.S. at 432.
9. Id. at 431 ("the touchstone is business necessity").
10. See, e.g., Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1982); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust Co., 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin Univ., 706
F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982); Pegues
v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073
(1984); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983); Tally v. United States
Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984); Harris v. Ford
Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1981); Cunningham v. Housing Auth. of Opelousas, 764 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1985);
Atono v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd and remanded,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982); Morre v. Hughes
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treatment theory can be utilized to challenge subjective or multifaceted employ-
ment practices. Other courts have come to the opposite conclusion.' 1 Still others
have refused to "enter this labyrinth"'" because of the evidence presented
in the particular cases. This confusion has generated much comment. 3
On June 22, 1987, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co.'" to resolve the conflict. It rendered
Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, 798 F.2d 590 (2nd
Cir. 1986); Emanuel v. Marsh, 828 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2891 (1988);
Griffin v. Board of Regents of Regency Univ., 795 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986); Namenworth
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin System, 769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985).
11. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
972 (1974); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983); Rowe v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982); Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.
1986); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982);
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109
S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir, 1982); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985); Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241 (10th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No.
11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981); Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444 (10th Cir.
1981); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 628 F.2d
419 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 919 (1977); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986); Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social
Serv., 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984); Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1984);
Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977);
Yartzoff v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1984); Peters v. Lieuallen, 746 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.
1984); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1981); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Hutto, 763 F.2d 979 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds,
474 U.S. 916 (1985); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1985); Domingo v. New England
Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), modified, 742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984).
12. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987); Robinson v.
Polaroid, 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982);
Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066
(1984); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea En
Accion v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986).
13. See, e.g., Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VIl's Disparate
Impact Theory, 1985 U. IL L. REV. 869; Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress
and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1, at 14-17 (1987); Thomson, The Disparate
Impact Theory: Congressional Intention in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 Indus. Rel. 105 (1986);
Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VIDisparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER
L. REv. 939 (1985); Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419
(1982); Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1982);
Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment-A Response to Prof. Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 776 (1983); Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does Discriminatory Impact Analysis
Apply?, 25 SAN' Dmio L. Rev. 63 (1988); Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers to Equality
for Faculty Women, 16 U.C. DAvs L. REv. 975 (1983); Waintroob, The Developing Law of
Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 Wm. & MARY
L. Rev. 45 (1979); Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA.
L. REv. 737 (1976).
14. 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
its decision on June 29, 1988.'5 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of
the Court, concluding that disparate impact analysis may be applied in a
challenge to a subjective or discretionary promotion system. All participating
justices concurred in this conclusion. At Parts II (C) and (D) of the opinion,
however, Justice O'Connor, in an effort to "decide what evidentiary stan-
dards should be applied" in such cases, 6 formulated a standard of proof
that is a radical departure from the standards set and utilized by the Court
in its prior decisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Scalia
concurred in this approach. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, filed an opinion roundly criticizing the plurality's new formula-
tion as "inconsistent with the proper evidentiary standards and with the pur-
poses of Title VII. ''7 Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion suggesting that
further discussion of the evidentiary standards to be applied in such cases
should be post-poned.' 8 Justice Kennedy took no part in the opinion.
The plurality's new evidentiary standard threatens to render a plaintiff's
success in many such cases virtually impossible. This result may yet be avoided,
however, since Justices Stevens and Kennedy expressed no view on the merits
of the plurality's resolution of this important issue.' 9
This article initially examines the traditional theories of proof in Title VII
cases. It then discusses approaches by lower courts in resolving the competing
concerns raised in applying those traditional theories in challenges to subjec-
tive selection devices. This article next discusses the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of the problem in Watson and suggests a workable alternative resolu-
tion that will not undermine the broad prophylactic purposes of Title VII.
15. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
16. 108 S. Ct. at 2782.
17. Id. at 2792.
18. Id. at 2797.
19. One could speculate that if Justice Kennedy had participated, he would have tended toward
the plurality view of the need for plaintiffs to identify with specificity the employment practices
challenged. This conclusion is based on the opinion he authored while sitting on the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in AFSCME v. Wash., 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). AFSCME
involved a challenge to the wage setting practices of the State of Washington as having an adverse
impact on women employees of the State who, historically, had received lower wages than men.
The district court analyzed the case under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theory,
and found that the State had violated Title VII under both. Judge Kennedy rejected the district
court's analysis under both theories. Citing Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th
Cir. 1982), Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 511 (1984), and Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd
and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), Judge Kennedy noted that "[t]he precedents do not per-
mit the case to proceed upon" a disparate impact theory. 770 F.2d at 1405. He concluded that
a compensation system which was "the result of a complex of market forces, does not constitute
a single practice that suffices to support a claim under disparate impact theory." Id. at 1406.
Justice Stevens's view on the issue is less clear, although his opinion for the Court in New
York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), suggests that he sympathizes with the plurality
view that the demands traditionally imposed on defendants in rebutting a prima facie case of
disparate impact should not be rigidly applied in all cases. See infra text accompanying note 74.
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Theories of Proof Under Title VII
The Individual Disparate Treatment Case
In the individual disparate treatment case,2 0 the plaintiff's burden is to
establish that the employer treated the plaintiff differently than it treated a
similarly situated individual and that the difference in treatment was based
on a prohibited factor. Upon such a showing, the defendant must come for-
ward with an explanation, a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the
different treatment.2 ' Assuming that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
is proffered, the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to establish to the
satisfaction of the court that the reason given was not the true reason, but
instead a "pretext" for discrimination. 2 Under the disparate treatment model,
the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains always with the plaintiff. 21 3
In the classic individual disparate treatment case, plaintiffs will establish
that they were qualified for and denied an employment benefit while major-
ity group members were provided the desired benefit or while the employer
continued to offer the benefit to others. This establishes a prima facie case
of intentional discrimination. ' To rebut this prima facie case, the defendant
must present credible evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the denial.2" The defendant's explanation must be "clear and reasonably
20. Referred to by the Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green as the "private, non-
class action" case.
21. Id. at 802.
22. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
23. Id.
24. McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), sets out a four part test for
establishing the prima facie case in individual disparate treatment cases. Under the McDonnell-
Douglas test, plaintiff must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and that the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.
The Court explained further that, because the facts in Title VII cases will necessarily vary,
"the prima facie proof" specified above "is not necessarily applicable in every respect of differing
factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
25. What constitutes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for apparently discriminatory conduct
is generally quite loosely defined by the courts. Practically any reason other than one related
to the plaintiff's protected status will suffice. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981), suggests that
a legitimate reason is one not linked to race. See, e.g., Parsons v. County of Del Notre, 728
F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) (person selected better qualified than plaintiff), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
846 (1984); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (failure to cooperate with
coworkers); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1984) (poor attendance); Cunningham
v. Housing Auth. of Opelousas, 764 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1985) (political patronage), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1007 (1985); Robinson v. Polaroid, 732 F.2d 1010, 1014 (Ist Cir. 1984) (good faith
exercise of professional judgment); Grano v. Dep't of Dev. of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836 (6th
Cir. 1983) (articulated belief in the inferiority of plaintiff's qualifications). Essentially, any reason
may suffice to meet the defendant's burden so long as it is nondiscriminatory on its face. All
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specific," 2" because plaintiffs must be given a full and fair opportunity to
establish that the reason proffered is pretextual.21
The prima facie case may be made in one of two ways. Most often a prima
facie case is established by meeting the McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green"
evidentiary pattern which establishes discrimination as the presumptive reason
for the adverse employment action. This model operates on the presumption
that where all factors obviously related to the employment decision are equal
and the race of the comparable individuals is different, race was the factor
that controlled the decision. 29 Because the presumption of intentional
discrimination is so easily established, it is also easily rebutted by the employer's
satisfactory articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action. At this point, the court, no longer bound by the mandatory
inference of intentional discrimination created by the prima facie case, must
consider all evidehce in determining whether the offered reason is pretextual. 0
The ultimate factual determination that must be made by the court is whether,
in light of all the evidence presented, the employer intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff."'
The prima facie case can also be established where the plaintiff offers direct
evidence that the employer had a discriminatory intent in making the challenged
employment decision. In these cases, the McDonnell-Douglas analysis is ob-
viously unnecessary since, where direct evidence of actual intent is extant,
no presumption of intent is required.3 2 Where there is direct evidence of in-
tentional discrimination, the defendant's rebuttal burden is significantly greater.
The defendant may not rebut the showing of intentional discrimination by
offering evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
action. Instead, the defendant must prove that the decision would not have
been different even if there had been no discriminatory intent. 3
that is required is that defendant "rais[e] a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. See generally Smith, Employer Defenses
in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and Substantive
Standards Following Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 T1w. L.Q. 372, 379 (1982).
26. 450 U.S. at 258.
27. This burden can be met "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 256 (1981).
28. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
29. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
30. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10.
31. Id. at 253; Untied States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
32. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("[t]he McDonnell-Douglas
test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination . . ."). See also
Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 934 (1st Cir. 1987); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777
F.2d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2860 (1988); Blalock v. Metal Trades,
Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985); Lams v. General Waterworks Corp., 766 F.2d 386 (8th Cir.
1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement
Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1985); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1981).
33. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (lst Cir. 1987); Miles v. M.N.C.
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The Class Disparate Treatment Case
Disparate treatment theory may also be utilized in cases involving discrimina-
tion against a class of plaintiffs. In such cases, as in individual cases,
discriminatory intent is an essential element of the plaintiff's proof." In class
cases, however, a presumption of intentional discrimination is not so easily
established as it is in individual cases where the McDonnell-Douglas model
is available. The presumption of intent in these cases may be raised only by
showing a statistically significant disparity in treatment between members of
the protected group and comparably qualified members of a majority group.
As in the McDonnell-Douglas model, disparate treatment analysis in class cases
operates on the assumption that discrimination is the cause if other ready
explanations for the disparity are excluded.3 5
Statistical evidence 6 showing gross disparities is generally sufficient to satisfy
the plaintiff's prima facie case. The statistical evidence in class disparate treat-
ment cases generally consists of comparisons between the racial composition
of an employer's work force and the racial composition of the relevant labor
pool from which employees are secured,37 a more direct comparison of "ap-
plicant flow" data showing the actual disparity in selection rates caused by
challenged employment practices,38 or the more sophisticated multiple regres-
sion analysis through which estimates of the effect on dependent variables
of isolated independent variables is calculated. 39 The existence of statistically
significant disparities rules out chance as the explanation for racially stratified
employment patterns, and raises a presumption of intentional discrimination.
40
In cases where the statistical showing is less compelling, there may be a need
Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (lth Cir. 1985); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 711 (6th Cir. 1985); Caviale v. State of
Wis. Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 744 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1984); Fadhl v. City
and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984); Smallwood v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 620 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Toney v. Block,
705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1980).
34. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Cooper
v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 n.9 (1984).
35. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
36. For an exhaustive discussion of the use of statistics in employment discrimihation litiga-
tion, see generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STAnTISCAL PROOF OF Discai ninATnoN (1980).
37. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
40. The Supreme Court has held that a statistical difference in treatment cases reaches the
requisite "gross disparity" when the difference between the expected treatment and the actual
treatment is greater than two or three standard deviations. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
496-97 n.17 (1977); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977)
("Absent explanation, standard deviations of greater than three generally signal discrimination.").
See also Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 821 n.32 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982) ("Statisticians tend to discard chance as an explanation for a result
when deviations from the expected value approach two standard deviations."); Griffin v. Carlin,
755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 618
(11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); Wheeler v. City of Columbus, Miss., 686
F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982); Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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to bring "the cold numbers convincingly to life" with some direct evidence
of individual instances of intentional discrimination. 4' The key in such cases
is to establish that discrimination was the "standard operating procedure"
of the employer.42 Because the statistically based prima facie case eliminates
the probability that the disparity was caused by chance, traditionally the plain-
tiff has not been required to identify a particular employment practice that
caused the disparity.
43
Once the prima facie case is made, the proof requirements imposed on a
defendant are significantly different from those in individual disparate treat-
ment cases. The employer may rebut the prima facie inference of intentional
discrimination only by offering evidence that undermines the plaintiff's
statistical showing, or by offering its own more probative statistical analysis
that provides a nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparity.14 Undermin-
ing the plaintiff's statistical showing challenges the facts upon which the
presumption of intent was founded. Providing a nondiscriminatory explana-
tion renders the presumption invalid by attributing the disparity to a legitimate
cause other than race. The defendant's submission of an alternative statistical
analysis explaining the alleged nondiscriminatory cause of the disparity then
is the point in the process where the cause of the disparity is first revealed
and where the court has before it the facts necessary to make the ultimate
determination whether intentional discrimination has occurred.4
41. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). See also, e.g., Wagner v.
Taylor, 836 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 283 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC v. American
Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982); Sledge v. J.P.
Stevens, 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
42. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977); Cooper v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
43. Identification of a particular tool used by an employer is inconsistent with a theory that
the employer utilizes a number of tools to effectuate its discriminatory motive, and impractical
where plaintiff is unaware of how the motive is being effectuated. Indeed, in International Bhd.
of Teamsters, the practices included ignoring requests for transfers, giving false or misleading
information about requirements, opportunities, and application procedures, and failure to consider
or hire blacks on the same basis as whites. 431 U.S. at 338. Recently, the Court supported this
notion in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986), stating, "as long as the court may
fairly conclude, in light of all the evidence, that it is more likely than not that impermissible
discrimination exists, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail."
44. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360 & n.46 ("demonstrating that the Govern-
ment's proof is either inaccurate or insignificant" or by "provid[ing] a nondiscriminatory expla-
nation for the apparently discriminatory result"). While the courts have never clearly delineated
the types or quantum of evidence necessary to meet that burden, it is clear that more than the
mere "articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason," as in individual treatment cases,
has been required. See Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980);
See Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?,
25 SA Drao L. Rnv. 63, 71 n.36 (1988).
45. It has been suggested that once the cause of the disparity in treatment cases is disclosed
by the defendant, that causative factor, if determined to suffice as a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for disparate treatment purposes, should also be anlayzed under disparate impact theory.
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If a finding of class wide disparate treatment is made, a prima facie case
on behalf of each member of the class is established.16 The defendant, at this
stage of the proceedings, as a proved wrongdoer, has a burden as to the claims
of individual class members which resembles the burden in individual disparate
treatment cases where direct evidence of intent forms the basis of the prima
facie case. 7 Once a class member establishes qualification for but denial of
the benefit sought, the employer must prove that the denial was for legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons.48 At this point the individual plaintiff seeking relief
on the basis of the "pattern and practice" of discrimination has the oppor-
tunity to show that the purported reason for the denial was pretextual. 49
The Class Disparate Impact Case
The focus of disparate impact theory is on the operation of employment
practices that have a discriminatory effect on a protected group. While
discriminatory intent is a necessary element in all disparate treatment cases,
it is wholly irrelevant 0 in the disparate impact case. In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., where the Supreme Court first articulated its theory of disparate im-
pact, the class of black applicants for jobs with the Duke Power Company
challenged the operation of two selection devices utilized by the Company
for screening applicants-a high school diploma requirement and a require-
D. BAIDus & J. CoLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 1.23 (1980); Bartholet, Application
of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1982). This suggestion has been
noted with interest by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). See also Lamber,
Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VII's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985
U. ILL. L. REv. 869, 884-86; Latinos Unidos De Chelsea En Accion v. Secretary of HUD, 799
F.2d 774, 787 n.22 (Ist Cir. 1986).
Analyzing the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for racial disparities under disparate impact
analysis allows for a complete analysis of the effects of employer practices once those practices
are identified and shown to have a discriminatory impact. This approach fails to compel so
complete an analysis, however, in those cases where the plaintiff's statistical showing is insufficient
to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and thereby shift to the defendant the
burden of offering an explanation for the disparity.
46. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
47. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. The burden on defendant, after a finding of discrimination across the class, is to prove
as to individual members of the class that the adverse employment decision was made for legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons. This burden has nothing to do with the establishment of class discrimina-
tion under the disparate treatment theory, but rather goes to the question of which of the class
members, presumptively entitled to relief, will be afforded relief. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 362. See also Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1031 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); Crak v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465,
470 (8th Cir. 1984); Perryman v. Johnson Products, 698 F.2d 1138 (11th Cir. 1983); Dillon v.
Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1004 (3d Cir. 1984).
49. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362 n.50.
50. See contra infra notes 53 & 99.
51. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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ment that the applicant pass a written examination. The plaintiffs presented
evidence that a disproportionate number of blacks failed both requirements.
The Court noted that the Act was designed to eliminate practices that were
"fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," ' 2 and dispensed with the need
to show intent.- 3 To establish a prima facie case under the Griggs analysis,
the plaintiff need only establish that the employer utilized a selection device
or combination of devices- ' which operated to exclude disproportionate
numbers of qualified minorities.
The plaintiff may establish the required disparate impact through various
statistical analyses.55 Generally, impact sufficient to make out a prima fadie
case is established by demonstrating with "applicant flow" data5 6 that the
challenged practice or criteria in fact rejected disproportionately members of
the protected group;57 by showing that the challenged requirement would
52. Id. at 432.
53. There was a long history of pre-Act intentional discrimination against blacks at the Duke
Power Company, and many commentators suggest that this history of intentional discrimination
supported the Court's adoption of disparate impact theory. In so concluding, they have suggested
that evidence of an intent to discriminate may be an appropriate prerequisite for applying the
disparate impact theory. See, e.g., Furnish, A Path Through The Maze, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419,
442 (1982).
However, the Griggs court was clear in stating that "good intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in-headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." 401 U.S. at 432. This fundamental aspect of disparate
impact analysis, that intent, past or present, is generally irrelevant, has been consistently confirmed
by the Court. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 454 ("resolution of the factual question of intent is not
what is at issue in this case"); Id. at 447 n.8 (legislative history of the 1972 amendments to
Title VII "demonstrat[ing] that Congress recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact analysis
employed by the Court in Griggs"). See also Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress
and Subjective Judgments, 63 Cm.-KNr L. REv. 1, at 14-17 (1987); Thomson, The Disparate
Impact Theory: Congressional Intention in 1972, A Response to Gold, 8 I1DUS. REL. 105 (1986);
Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER
L. REv. 939 (1985). Cf. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems and Origin
of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. 429 (1985).
54. See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 972, appeal after remand, 799 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1986); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d
1516 (11th Cir. 1985); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988); Green v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure
defines selection procedures to which impact theory may apply as "[a]ny measure, combination
of measures, or procedure ...." Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.16(Q) (1987). See also 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMNT DiscRtMINAT1ON § 50.81
n.63 (1987).
55. See generally D. BAX.Dus & J. CoLE, STATISTIcAL PROOF OF DISCRMNATION (1980); B.
Sc=nI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DisCRIMINATION LAW 1326 (2d ed. 1983).
56. Applicant flow analysis determines the effect of selection criteria by analyzing the employer's
actual experience. The effect of the challenged criterion is measured as to individuals who were
in fact affected by the criterion.
57. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (criticizing tests which
"select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of
the pool of applicants").
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operate to exclude a disproportionate number of protected group members
in the relevant labor pool because such individuals do not meet the require-
ment;" or by comparing the racial composition of the employer's work force
to the racial composition of a relevant labor pool."9 Where a current disparate
impact cannot be demonstrated, but current practices have the effect of freezing
in place the discriminatory status quo by perpetuating the effects of past
discrimination, that effect also is actionable under disparate impact theory.
60
The statistical comparisons necessary to meet the plaintiffs' burden of
demonstrating disparate impact need not rise to the level of statistical
58. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (citing statistics showing
that in North Carolina 12% of black males had completed high school, while 34% of white
males had done so); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (citing statistics that a
height and weight requirement would operate to exclude 41.13% of the female population and
less than 1% of the male population); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586
n.29 (1979) (citing Dothard in stating that a statistical showing of disparate impact need not
always be based on an analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants).
59. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13 (urging the need for greater refinement in
plaintiff's statistical proof, but recognizing "the probative force of ... comparative work-force
statistics); NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (when widespread minority underemployment is shown to exist in
a given occupation, primary selection devices should not be immunized from study by placing
an unrealistically high threshold burden upon those with least access to relevant data). See also
Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit,
645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981); Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg., 613 F.2d 527, 545 n.35 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981); EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178
(4th Cir. 1979); Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal
Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 Wiu. & MARY L. RV.
45, 76 (1979); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, 89 Hhv. L. RE. 387, 391 (1975); Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, The Relevance
of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553, 590 (1983); Shobin,
Probing The Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures With Disparate Impact
Analysis Under Title VII, 56 Tax. L. REv. 1 (1977). But see 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EliP.OY-
MENTI DISCRmNATON § 74.41 (1988) (argument made that utilization analysis alone can never
prove impact). Cf. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(1987) (creating an inference of disparate impact based on underutilization and a failure to main-
tain more probative data; it is clear that a simple workforce/labor market analysis alone is
significantly less probative that an analysis of the actual effect of challenged devices on actual
applicants). However, this is not to say that general comparative data is wholly irrelevant. Where
applicant flow data is unavailable (see infra note 140) or unreliable (see infra note 249),
workforce/labor market analysis may be the most probative evidence that can be brought to
bear on the question of disparate impact.
60. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 349 ("one kind of practice fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation, is that which perpetuates the effect of prior discrimination").
This perpetuation theory was widely utilized by the courts during the early development of Title
VII law. See cases cited infra at note 125. The theory was thrown into relative obscurity after
International Bhd. of Teamsters clarified the section 703(h) protection from challenge afforded
bona fide seniority systems, but lately has shown a slight resurgence. See, e.g., Giles v. Ireland,
742 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 699 F.
Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983). Prac-
tices that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination can also be challenged under disparate
treatment theory. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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significance required to establish a prima facie showing in class disparate treat-
ment cases. In impact cases, plaintiffs need not demonstrate gross disparities,
but only a substantial or significant impact upon a protected group.6' Because
the central focus in disparate impact cases is on the effects of employment
practices and not the intent of the employer, a disparity sufficient to eliminate
chance as the cause of the disparity (thereby raising an inference of intent)
is not required. 62 Instead, plaintiffs must establish only that the challenged
practice produced the observed disparity. It is appropriate, therefore, to re-
quire the plaintiff to identify, to the extent possible, the challenged devices
and the resultant impact. In all fairness to the employer, a plaintiff should
be as specific as possible in identifying that which is alleged to be discriminatory
and how it is discriminatory. Once that showing is made, the defendant must
justify use of the challenged devices by establishing a "business necessity"-
a "manifest relationship to the employment in question."' 3
In Griggs and in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody," the business necessity
of the challenged job requirement was analyzed in terms of its job relatedness.
Typically, a defendant establishes the job relatedness of a particular selection
device through validation of that device. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures (UGESP), 65 as well as the American Psychological
Association Guidelines, 66 recognize three basic methods of test validation: (1)
content; (2) construct; (3) and criterion. 67 These three accepted methods of
test validation are designed to measure the relationship between performance
on a test or other selection device and performance on the job for which
the selection device serves as a screen. The defendant may rebut by other
means, however, if it is unable to technically validate the challenged selection
61. The Supreme Court decisions in disparate impact cases have not required the use of
sophisticated statistical techniques, relying instead on a common sense observation whether the
impact shown is substantial or significant. See generally Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446
(1982); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859 (1lth Cir. 1986); Maddox v. Claytor, 764
F.2d 1539, 1548 (lth Cir. 1985). The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure
contains, as a rule of thumb, what has been called the "fourth-fifths" rule. This rule provides
that if the selection rate for the protected group is less than 80% of the selection rate for the
majority group, adverse impact may be presumed. Application of the rule will depend on factors
relating to the reliability of the data such as the size of the sample and whether the numbers
reported are distorted. UGESP, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1987).
62. See cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (1982).
64. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1987).
66. American Psychological Association, Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests,
1974.
67. Content validation requires a showing that the test is representative of the content of
the job; criterion validation, a showing that there are significant correlations between test perfor-
mance and job performance; and construct validation, a showing that the test accurately measures
traits possessed by candidates that have been shown to be important to successful job performance.
See UGESP, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1987).
[Vol. 42:187
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/2
19891 CHALLENGING DISCRIMINATORY GUESSWORK 199
device. Validation is but one means of establishing job relatedness, and job
relatedness is but one method for establishing business necessity. The UGESP,
recognizing there may be situations in which an employer may experience dif-
ficulty in applying traditional validation techniques to selection devices, pro-
vides that where the principal validation techniques cannot be utilized, the
employer should "otherwise justify continued use of the procedure in accord
with federal law." 8 This provision recognizes that while validation may be
the preferred method of demonstrating job relatedness, the business necessity
concept encompasses a broader range of justifications for utilizing devices
that result in adverse effects.
How the business necessity standard applies to a requirement that has some
logical relationship to job performance but has not been shown to be predic-
tive of ability is unclear.69 In Davis v. Washington," the Supreme Court found
error in the court of appeals' reversal of a district court holding that defen-
dant's testing requirement for police officers was job related. The district court
held that because the test was "reasonably and directly related to requirements
of the police recruit training program," it was sufficiently job related to be
upheld under Title VII standards. 7' The court of appeals reversed the district
court because the relationship between the test and training school success
did not satisfy the requirement of a direct relationship between the test and
performance on the job.7 2 The Supreme Court, discussing the Griggs stan-
dard, stated that the district court's conclusion that "a positive relationship
between the test and training-course performance was sufficient to validate
the former, wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual job perform-
ance as a police officer," was not foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle,
and was "the much more sensible construction of the job-relatedness require-
ment.""
68. UGESP, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6(B)(1) (1987).
69. See generally Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NomTE
DANM L. REv. 318 (1987); Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability
in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PI. L. REV. 555 (1985). Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism
and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376 (1981). Cf. Comment, The Business
Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 911 (1979).
70. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
71. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D. D.C. 1972).
72. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
73. 426 U.S. at 251. While Davis was brought under the fourteenth amendment and not
Title VII, the Court still applied Title VII standards. Courts have followed the Davis analysis
under Title VII and in other contexts. See Aguilera v. Cook County Merit Board, 760 F.2d
844 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 907 (1985), where Judge Posner affirmed a district court's
granting of summary judgment for defendant in a case challenging defendant's requirement of
a high school diploma for corrections officers. Judge Posner, after equating the Griggs require-
ment that the challenged device "bear a demonstrable relationship to successful job performance"
with "fulfill[ingl a genuine business need," found that the requirement was job related. See
also United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D. S.C. 1977); National Educ. Ass'n
v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th
Cir. 1972).
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The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer" appears to have extended the business necessity defense even further
to encompass job requirements that are neither "validated" as job related
in the Griggs sense nor logically related to job performance in the Davis sense,
but are logically related to other legitimate employer concerns. In Beazer,
the Court upheld a job requirement which excluded all narcotics users (in-
cluding methadone users) from all jobs with the Transit Authority regardless
of their safety sensitivity.7 Plaintiffs challenged the requirement as having
a disparate impact on blacks. 7' Utilizing the general language of Griggs, the
Court reasoned that because the employer's "legitimate employment goals"
were "significantly served by" the exclusionary rule, the requirement bore
a "manifest relationship to the employment in question.""7 In Davis and Beazer
then, the Court expanded the concept of business necessity beyond the bounds
of job relatedness to include consideration of the relationship between the
challenged criteria and other legitimate business concerns.
In impact cases then, the defendant is required either to attack the credibility
of the plaintiff's showing of effect or to establish the affirmative defense of
business necessity. If the defendant fails to meet its burden of persuasion on
the business necessity of the challenged practice, or if it fails otherwise to
undermine the plaintiff's showing of disparate impact, the plaintiff's prima
facie showing of discrimination controls and a finding of discrimination must
be made. 78 If the defendant is able to establish the business necessity of the
74. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
75. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 594.
76. Evidence presented was inconclusive, but, in plaintiffs' view, indicated that significantly
more blacks than whites were excluded by the rule. The Supreme Court found that a prima
facie case had not been established because of inadequacies in plaintiffs' data. Nonetheless, it
went on to address the business necessity defense.
77. 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31.
78. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (employer must "meet the
burden of proving that its tests are job related"); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977) (employer must "prov(e) that the challenge requirements are job related"); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question"); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (employer must then demonstrate
that "any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question"); Vulcan
Society of New York v. Civil Service Comm. of New York, 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973)
(defendant's rebuttal burden is one of persuasion); EEOC v. Navaho Ref., 593 F.2d 988, 990
(10th Cir. 1979) (burden of proof shifts); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 752-53
(5th Cir. 1980) (defendant's burden is one of persuasion), vacated, 451 U.S. 902 (1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 662-63 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (affirmative defense), vacated on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 868 (11th Cir.
1986) ("the burden of persuasion shifts"); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1548 (l1th Cir.
1985) ("parties alternatively bear burdens of proof by a preponderance of the evidence instead
of mere burdens to product"); EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1201 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982). But see NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d
1322, 1333-36 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting contention that business relatedness constitutes an affir-
mative defense); Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (defendant need only
come forward with evidence to meet the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case).
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practice, the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to show "pretext" by
demonstrating that there are less discriminatory alternatives that would serve
the employer's legitimate purposes equally well," or that the employer used
the device with the intent to discriminate.80
The Individual Disparate Impact Case
Disparate impact theory has also proved useful to individual plaintiffs. Us-
ing selection devices which have an adverse impact on a protected group violates
the Title VII rights of every member of that protected group affected by their
use. Consequently, individual plaintiffs who can establish discrimination under
disparate impact theory are entitled to relief upon a showing that they, in-
dividually, were adversely affected by the challenged practice. 1 In all other
respects, however, the order and elements of proof in individual disparate
impact cases are identical to those in class impact cases.82
The Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal,8 3 significantly expanded the
usefulness of disparate impact theory in individual cases. By applying disparate
impact analysis to the individual components of a selection process, despite
the fact that the overall process did not have a discriminatory effect on the
protected group, the Court recognized that Title VII is directed at ridding
the employment process of non-job-related selection devices that tend to deprive
individual members of protected groups of employment opportunities.
4
Therefore, even where the "bottom line" result of a selection process reveals
no disparate impact, if an individual component of the process substantially
excludes more protected group members than others, a case can be made as
to that component.
The remainder of this article will focus on class disparate treatment and
disparate impact cases. Individual disparate impact cases, as noted above, are
indistinguishable from class impact cases except that the plaintiff must establish
the discriminatory practice had an individualized effect. Individual disparate
treatment cases are unique because the McDonnell-Douglas model controls.
In such cases, the selection device used is insignificant until the defendant
asserts its legitimacy. Where subjective decisionmaking is offered as the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an individual adverse employment deci-
79. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See also, e.g., Kilgo Georgia
State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (lth Cir. 1985);
Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 255 n.7 (8th Cir. 1985); Merwine v. Board of
Trustees for State Instits. of Higher Learning, 754 F.2d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 823 (1985); Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d
1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1984); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 873 (11th Cir. 1986).
80. See infra note 99.
81. See, e.g., Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1981); Lasso
v. Woodman of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1984).
82. See B. ScmHn & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLoYMNT DiSCRUMNATION LAW 1290 n.24 (2d ed. 1983).
83. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
84. Id. at 448-51.
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sion, courts view such an explanation as suspect." Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine's requirement that the legitimate non-
discriminatory reason be presented with sufficient specificity so the plaintiff
is afforded the opportunity to show pretext weighs heavily against accepting
a purely subjective judgment with no objective explanation. 6 This article
therefore will not address challenges to subjective decisionmaking under thege
two analytical models.
This article also will not address the situation in which there is evidence
that an employer has applied its subjective judgment in a discriminatory manner
by applying it to various groups differently. In such cases, the disparate treat-
ment model is clearly applicable. 87 Regardless of the nature of the selection
device used, the theory of these cases is that the employer in applying it to
different groups did not use it in the same manner.
The focus of this article is on challenges to the systemic effects of subjec-
tive decisionmaking processes under the class disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories. In disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, statistics
play a critical role. In such cases, a court generally has sufficient data available
to choose the method of analysis. Clearly "either theory may. . . be applied
to a particular set of facts." '88 The decision as to which analytical method
to use has generally been determined by the plaintiff based on the nature of
the available evidence. 89
Plaintiffs should not be precluded from proceeding under traditional
disparate impact analysis simply because the selection device challenged in-
volves the subjective judgment of the employer. By limiting the analytical
model in such cases to disparate treatment, the plaintiffs' burden of establishing
the prima facie case of discrimination and, ultimately, that unlawful discrimina-
tion has occurred is increased, and the defendant's rebuttal burden is
significantly decreased. Traditional disparate impact analysis is an appropriate
85. E.g., Uviedo v. Steve's Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Nord v. U.S. Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1985); Mozee v. Jeffboat,
Inc., 746 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985); Stallworth v. Shuler,
777 F.2d 1431 (l1th Cir. 1985).
87. See, e.g., Davis v. Metro. Dade County, 480 F. Supp. 679 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Stallings
v. Container Corp., 75 F.R.D. 511 (D. Del. 1977); Osahar v. Carlin, 642 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.
Fla. 1986). See generally Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978).
88. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See
also Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 686 F.2d 1144, 1150 (5th Cir. 1982); Rowe v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 92 (6th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 197
(4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361,
396 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Wright v. National Archives and Records
Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1042 (10th Cir. 1981);
Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1987); Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d
534, 536 (7th Cir. 1986); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 702 (8th Cir. 1980);
Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1984).
89. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 307 n.12.
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method for allocating fairly the respective burdens of proof and determining
whether unlawful discrimination has occurred.
The Differences in Analysis Under Class Disparate Treatment
and Disparate Impact Theories
The differences between class disparate treatment theory and disparate im-
pact theory have traditionally been insignificant in determining their applicabil-
ity to various fact situations. Both theories constitute attacks on the systemic
adverse results of employment practices. Under disparate treatment theory,
the allegation is that the disparity is the result of employment practices ap-
plied in an intentionally discriminatory manner. Under disparate impact theory,
the allegation is that the disparity is the result of use of employment practices
which, regardless of intent, have a discriminatory effect and cannot be justified
by business necessity. Under either theory, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing a class-based disparity. The plaintiff's burden, when relying on
statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of class discrimination, has
traditionally been greater under disparate treatment theory than under disparate
impact theory. Courts have described the difference in terms of the plaintiff's
burden to establish a "gross disparity" under treatment theory and a "marked
disparity" under impact theory. 9"
This is a sound approach in light of the difference in the function of proof
of a disparity under treatment and impact theories. Under treatment theory,
the disparity is used to raise a presumption of intentional discrimination.
Because of the significance of a presumption of intentional discrimination,
courts are justifiably reluctant to make such a presumption except on the basis
of truly convincing evidence. Because the function of proof of a disparity
under the impact model is simply to establish the adverse effect of an
employer's practices and not to raise an inference of intentional discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff traditionally has been required to show only a marked or
substantial disparity in the success rates of comparable groups."
90. Payne v. Travenol Labs, 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982);
Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 535 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
91. In Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 Cm.-
KENT L. Rav. 1, 3-4 & n.13 (1987), the author notes that the Supreme Court never refined the
concept of disparate impact, and that some lower courts have mistakenly equated "disparate
impact" with the "two or three standard deviation" analysis utilized in disparate treatment cases.
Standard deviation analysis, however, is intended to identify intentional discrimination-not whether
the practice had a disparate impact. Statistical significance is relevant to the issue of intentional
discrimination because it negates the possibility that the result being measured occurred by chance.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). Thus, the likelihood remains
that the result was intentional. Other courts, he notes, have relied on the "80%o rule" of UGESP,
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1986), to identify disparate impact. The existence of disparate impact
however, in the view of most courts, has been based on a judgment call as to whether the dif-
ference was "substantial" or "significant" in a given case. B. Sc iEi & P. GRossMAN, EmrLoy-
MENT DIscRnMNAnoN LAw 98-99 (2d ed. 1983). As Blumrosen suggests, the avoidance of tests
of statistical significance is appropriate since the question of whether the result occurred by chance
or design is irrelevant to the question of whether the challenged practice operates as a "built
in headwind."
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The rebuttal burdens placed on the defendants also have been different.
In disparate treatment cases, the defendants must rebut the presumption of
intentional discrimination by either challenging the accuracy of the plaintiff's
statistical case or by providing a nondiscriminatory explanation for the dispar-
ity. 92 In disparate impact cases, however, the defendant must either under-
mine the existence of a disparate result by challenging the accuracy of the
plaintiff's statistics or justify the result by establishing the business necessity
of the challenged practice. 93 In treatment cases, the rationale is that there
can be no business justification for intentional discrimination.94 The defen-
dant's only recourse is to rebut the presumption of discriminatory intent by
showing that the disparities do not exist or that they were caused by legitimate
nondiscriminatory factors. It would add nothing to a disparate impact analysis
for the defendant to rebut a nonexistent presumption of discriminatory intent
by presenting evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation. Instead,
the defendant must affirmatively justify utilizing a device that results in a
prohibited disparity.
Another significant difference between the two theories relates to the plain-
tiff's showing of pretext. Under impact theory, once the business necessity
of the challenged practice is established, the plaintiff is given the opportunity
to establish the existence of alternative devices that could minimize the adverse
effect and serve equally well the employer's legitimate business concerns."
In treatment cases, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the
defendant's offered nondiscriminatory reason is not the real reason, but is
instead a cover-up for intentional discrimination. The "pretext" showing in
disparate impact cases, that there are alternative, equally effective and less
discriminatory practices, is evidence that the court may consider in determin-
ing that the business reasons proffered by the defendant do not constitute
"business necessity." 96 The Court in Beazer cast some doubt on the function
of evidence of the existence of equally effective and less discriminatory alter-
natives when it stated that "the district court's express finding that the rule
was not motivated by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it
92. See supra note 44.
93. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
94. An exception applies where the BFOQ defense comes into play (see supra note 6), or
when there is a call for legitimate affirmative action. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa
Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
95. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (existence of a less discriminatory
alternative would be evidence that employer was using its tests merely as a pretext for
discrimination).
96. Id. at 428; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329. Indeed, if there is an equally effective and less
discriminatory alternative decision-making process, it is difficult to conceive how the challenged
one could be deemed necessary. See Furnish, A Path Through the Maze, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419,
423-24 (1982). See also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); UGESP, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1986); Barthelot, Applica-
tion of Title VIl to Jobs in High Places, 95 Hagv. L. Ry. 945, 1023-26 (1982); Player, Applicants,
Applicants in the Hall, Who's the Fairest of them All? Comparing Qualifications Under Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 277, 281 (1985).
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was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination." 97 This statement, along
with the observation that the Court's impact cases have been decided in a
factual context suggesting the existence of intentional discrimination,98 has
led commentators to suggest that the intent of the employer is necessarily
relevant in impact cases.9 The better view, however, particularly in light of
the Supreme Court's consistent position that intent is irrelevant in disparate
impact analysis, is that the plaintiff's surrebuttal evidence may be considered
as undermining the defendant's proof of business necessity, or as converting
the analysis to a treatment analysis focusing on the motivation of the employer
in choosing a selection process that produces a significant disparity."'
97. 440 U.S. at 587.
98. See supra note 53.
99. In Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment-A Response to Prof. Bartholet, 77
Nw. U.L. REv. 776, 780 (1983), the author notes that the Court's description in Albemarle of
the evidentiary function of plaintiff's proof at this surrebuttal stage and its treatment of the
"pretext" stage in Beazer, "indicates that once the employer has satisfied the requirements of
the effects test itself, the existence of a less discriminatory alternative might support an inference
that he is engaging in intentional discrimination."
In Furnish, A Path Through the Maze, 23 B.C.L. Rav. 419, 423 (1982), the author suggests
that the rebuttal opportunity provided to plaintiff under impact theory may be viewed as a surrogate
method for proving intentional discrimination and that this development, along with the broadening
of the business necessity defense in Beazer, portends the merger of the two theories.
But in Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 H.Av. L. REv. 945
(1982), the author concludes that Title VII demands that the employer opt for any available
system that has a lesser impact and serves the employer's legitimate job needs. Professor Bartholet
never reaches the question of intent because a showing of a less discriminatory alternative would
negate defendant's assertion of business necessity.
Similarly in Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments,
36 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 1, 24 (1987), the author criticizes those courts that have refused to apply
impact analysis to subjective decision-making for viewing impact theory as a proxy for showing
intentional discrimination, and suggests that Justice Powell's Teal dissent is grounded in the
mistaken notion that a plaintiff in adverse impact cases makes his case by inference.
Regardless of whether plaintiff can put the question of intent at issue at the "pretext" stage
of impact cases, it is clear that intent is of no relevance prior to the point at which the employer
establishes the business necessity of the challenge practice. In Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing
Vitality of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. Ray. 939, 964-65 (1986), the
authors state a requirement that plaintiff show that a challenged, but justified, practice is a
pretext for intentional discrimination does not warrant the conclusion that intent is an element
of adverse impact cases before the surrebuttal stage of the case. Such an approach fails to recognize
that Title VII was designed to eliminate those practices that "limit and classify ... [individuals]
... in a way which ... deprive[s] [them] of employment opportunities ... because of...
race," or as the court said in Griggs, act as "built-in-headwinds" to the full enjoyment of their
rights. The weight of authority holds that intent is never put at issue. See Player, supra note
96, at 281 n.25 ("the current weight of lower court authority appears to analyze the concept
of less discriminatory alternatives as part of the necessity concept"). In short, there is nothing
to preclude a plaintiff in surrebuttal from demonstrating that a defendant has utilized practices
that can be justified by business necessity intentionally to discriminate. There is also nothing
that would require such a showing. Plaintiff may either in effect, transform the case into a disparate
treatment case by establishing discriminatory intent, or demonstrate alternatives and undermine
the claimed necessity of the device.
100. There is no apparent doctrinal objection to converting treatment analysis to impact analysis
upon a defendant's establishment of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that is shown to
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A final difference between the two theories is that disparate treatment is
typically utilized in situations where no one selection device operates to ex-
clude blacks, but blacks are systematically excluded by a variety of devices
that constitute the employer's "standard operating procedure." Clearly, where
the decisionmaking process produces racially disparate results which statistics
reveal could not have been caused by chance, a court is justified in operating
on a rebuttable presumption that racial discrimination caused the disparity.101
The disparate impact model has typically been utilized where blacks are
systematically excluded by the operation of an identifiable and objective selec-
tion device. Where the device challenged is objective and identifiable, its ef-
fects can be easily measured and its business necessity can be easily analyzed. 0 2
Because chance is not ruled out as a possible cause of the disparity shown
in such cases, establishing a nexus between the challenged practices and the
observed result is appropriately required. The need to establish a causal link
between challenged practices and their results, however, does not require that
impact theory be limited to isolated and specifically identifiable practices.10
Where an employer utilizes a system of decisionmaking composed of several
component parts and which produces a discriminatory result, a trial court
may reasonably conclude that the system has caused the result without delv-
ing into the individual effects of its several component parts. Any absolute
limitation on the use of discrimination theories or any significant modifica-
tion of those theories based on the nature of the selection devices used serves
no useful purpose and is inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII.
Early Analysis of Subjective Selection Criteria
The Dillon-Rowe Days
Early in the development of Title VII, courts were not reluctant to apply
disparate impact theory to subjective and multifaceted selection devices. For
example, in United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 104 the government presented
evidence of "a decentralized system of hiring and assignment which vested
broad authority on the supervisors of largely segregated departments and which
had no uniform or objective standards for hiring or assignment." 1 S The
have an adverse impact. See supra note 45. The converse, converting impact analysis to treat-
ment analysis upon a showing of intent, should be equally non-controversial and should not
compel a conclusion that the distinction between the two theories must be blurred. For a com-
plete discussion of this question, see Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection
Criteria: The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 1.
101. See supra text accompanying note 40.
102. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); New York Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
103. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11th Cir. 1985). See also cases cited supra
at note 54.
104. 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970).
105. Id. at 802.
[Vol. 42:187206
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/2
19891 CHALLENGING DISCRIMINATORY GUESSWORK 207
government sought to demonstrate that this system operated to perpetuate
the effects of past racial discrimination. The district court refused to admit
evidence of past discriminatory practices and patterns, and dismissed the ac-
tion on the ground that the government had failed to establish any present
violations.' Citing section 703(a)(2) of the Act, 107 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment noting that it "should
have considered any past specific or general act, practice, policy or pattern
of racial discrimination which the proof showed had any present discriminatory
effect."'0 8 The court held that such practices, "even though neutral on their
face, may operate to segregate and classify on the basis of race at least as
effectively as overt racial discrimination."'' 0 9
Similarly, in Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,"' plaintiffs challenged the
system by which individuals were promoted from lower paying hourly jobs
to better paying salaried jobs in General Motors' Atlanta Division (GMAD).
GMAD required that to be considered for promotion, hourly employees must
receive the recommendation of their foreman. The foreman's recommenda-
tion was based in large part on his subjective evaluation of the hourly
employee's "ability, merit and capacity.""'I Based on statistical evidence show-
ing a "vivid and significant" disparity in the promotion of blacks to salaried
jobs," 2 and citing the Griggs rationale that "any employment practices which
operate to prejudice minority employees must be eliminated and their conse-
quences eradicated, '""I3 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that
the promotional system utilized by GMAD violated Title VII. I' The evidence
showed clearly that the vague and subjective promotion procedure had a
disparate impact on black hourly employees, and constituted a prima facie
Title VII violation.
In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,'" the question before the court
was whether selection for supervisory positions based on the subjective judg-
106. United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 314 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. N.C. 1969).
107. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (Court stating that a disparate-impact
claim reflects the language of § 703(a)(2)).
108. Diffion, 429 F.2d at 804.
109. Id.
110. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 353.
112. Id. at 357.
113. Id. at 354.
114. Id. at 358-59. The Court noted that the promotion system violated Title VII on several
grounds, but particularly because:
(i) the foreman's recommendation is the indispensable single most important factor
in the promotion process;
(ii) foremen are given no written instructions pertaining to the qualifications
necessary for promotion .... ;
(iii) those standards which were determined to be controlling are vague and sub-
jective .... ; and
(v) there are no safeguards in the procedure designed to avert discriminatory
practices.
Id.
115. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
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ment of superintendents violated Title VII. Despite testimony that only one
of approximately 100 supervisors was black, the trial court denied relief." 6
Because this statistical disparity resulted from a system that included both
the subjective judgment of supervisors and an objective testing requirement
that had been terminated prior to trial, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit framed the question as "whether selection on the basis of the subjec-
tive judgment of all-white supervisors operates independently of the testing
to discriminate and helped produce this disparity.""' 7 The Fifth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court on the issue of "the independent ef-
fect of subjective evaluation by all-white superintendents.""'
In Muller v. United States Steel Corp.,"19 a case challenging the discretionary
system utilized in promoting employees at U.S. Steel, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stated, "The law is clear that a plaintiff in a job
discrimination case need not prove that the employer had a specific intent
to discriminate. It is sufficient that the employer's conduct produced
discriminatory results." 1 20 The court affirmed the district court's finding of
discrimination. The finding was based on evidence that the promotion system,
which relied on the "uncontrolled discretion" of the general foreman, resulted
in no Hispanic employee ever being promoted to a supervisory position. The
court went on in its disparate impact analysis to find that the defendant had
not established the business necessity of its subjective practice since it had
"not shown ... that efficiency or safety or any other of the company's in-
terests are served by this system which depends on hunch judgments rather
than specific criteria."'
2'
In Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp. ,122 plaintiffs launched a challenge to
Union Carbide's system of promoting employees based on the supervisors'
subjective evaluation of job candidates. Finding a substantial statistical
disparity between the percentage of blacks in the area (approximately 28%)
and the percentage of blacks in supervisory or salaried positions (less than
10%), the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case
of discrimination. Union Carbide's claim that its system of promotion was
nondiscriminatory was rejected by the Fifth Circuit. The court noted that super-
visory evaluations based on a candidate's " 'adaptability,' 'bearing, demeanor,
manner,' 'verbal expression,' 'appearance,' 'maturity,' 'drive,' and 'social
behavior' . . . subjects the ultimate promotion decision to the intolerable oc-
currence of conscious or unconscious prejudice."'1
2
116. Id. at 240.
117. Id. at 241.
118. Id. at 243.
119. 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
120. Id. at 927.
121. Id. at 929. The "any other of the company's interests" phrase presaged the expansion
of the business necessity defense in Beazer. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
122. 538 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 544 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 822 (1977).
123. Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
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Most of the Courts of Appeals, until the Fifth Circuit decision in Pouncy
v. Prudential Insurance Co.,'11 generally followed the lead set by the courts
in Dillon and Rowe. They recognized the impediment to equal employment
opportunity inherent in allowing the unchecked use of subjective decision-
making processes. The majority of courts evaluated the operation of selec-
tion processes which relied upon vague and subjective criteria, not in terms
of the employer's intent, but in terms of the impact of such systems on pro-
tected groups."2 s Of course some courts refused to apply disparate impact
theory to subjective decisionmaking prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Pouncy. They made no attempt, however, to articulate a rationale for that
position.'26 Some of these courts analyzed subjective systems under disparate
treatment theory and found discrimination.' 27 Others analyzed them under
impact theory and found no discrimination. 28
It was not until the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in Pouncy that the
widespread reluctance to find discrimination based purely on the effects of
using vague and subjective systems became evident. Pouncy has been relied
on for the proposition that disparate impact theory cannot be utilized in
challenges to the discriminatory effect of subjective procedures, but that
124. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
125. See, e.g., Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers,
Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th
Cir. 1975); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel, 635
F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d
1374 (5th Cir. 1974); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Local
38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Williams v. Colorado
Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981); Stewart v. General Motors Corp.,
542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Rule v. I.A.B.S.O.I., Local
Union No. 396, 568 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Rice, Inc., 628 F.2d 419
(5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 451 U.S. 902 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
126. See, e.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981); Young v. Edgcomb
Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D. N.C. 1973); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d
388, 394 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); Heagney
v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
127. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Sledge v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 1978) ("where
[strong statistical] proof is coupled with evidence that the defendant based hiring and other employ-
ment decisions upon the subjective opinions of white supervisors, the trial court is entitled to
infer ... that the defendant illegally discriminated"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
128. See, e.g., Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 453 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981) (portend-
ing the Watson result, the court noted that "the statistics used in cases not involving specific
employment tests must be more closely scrutinized that the statistics used in cases where specific
mechanisms are at issue"). See also Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1981); Wright
v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1979).
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reliance is misplaced. This proposition is neither logically nor legally justified
by the Pouncy decision.
Pouncy
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy v. Prudential In-
surance Co."' provided the catalyst for a significant change in the way courts
viewed challenges to subjective selection practices. In Pouncy, the plaintiff
challenged the system utilized by the Prudential Insurance Company for pro-
moting hourly employees to salaried positions. The system failed to notify
employees of job opportunities, allowed movement only within an employee's
job level and relied heavily on the subjective judgment of supervisory
employees. The court of appeals affirmed the district court finding for the
defendant. In so doing, the court made several general statements that have
served as the basis for the conclusion that disparate impact theory is not ap-
plicable when subjective or multifaceted systems are challenged:
The discriminatory impact model of proof ... is not ... the
appropriate vehicle from which to launch a wide ranging attack
on the cumulative effect of a company's employment practices.
Although some courts have used the disparate impact model of
proof to challenge multiple employment practices simultaneously,
[citation omitted], this is an incorrect use of the riodel. The
disparate impact model applies only when an employer has in-
stituted a specific procedure, usually a selection criterion for
employment, that can be shown to have a causal connection to
a class based imbalance in the work force.
None of the three Prudential 'employment practices' singled out
[the failure to post job openings, the use of a level system, and
evaluating employees with subjective criteria] are akin to the
'facially neutral employment practices' the disparate impact model
was designed to test.
Unlike educational requirements, aptitude tests, and the like, the
practices identified by Pouncy are not selection procedures to which
the disparate impact model traditionally has applied." 0
The court was partially correct in its conclusion that the challenged selec-
tion devices were not procedures to which the disparate impact model had
traditionally been applied. 3 ' The court was also justified in its observation
that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a causal connection between a specific
employment practice and a significant racial imbalance.'32 A number of courts,
129. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
130. Id. at 800-01.
131. This assertion, however, was irrelevant to the decision and more importantly, as to the
practice of subjectively evaluating employees, inaccurate. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
132. Plaintiff's work force/labor market analysis did not conclusively establish a causal con-
nection between the challenged practices and the work force disparity shown. Pouncy, 668 F.2d
at 801. See supra note 59.
[Vol. 42:187
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/2
1989] CHALLENGING DISCRIMINATORY GUESSWORK 211
however, have gone beyond the holding in Pouncy and relied on the above
language as compelling the conclusion that the disparate impact model is only
applicable in instances where isolated and objective selection devices, such
as educational requirements, aptitude tests, and the like, are challenged.'
33
The following expresses the underlying rationale for the Pouncy court's af-
firmance of the district court's decision that unlawful discrimination had not
been proven:
The appellant cannot make a showing that the Prudential employ-
ment practices that he has identified have caused the racial im-
balance in Prudential's work force. The disparate impact model
requires proof of a causal connection between a challenged employ-
ment practice and the composition of the work force. Aptitude
tests ... and similar selection criteria all may be shown to affect
one class of employees more harshly than another by controlling
for the impact of the employment practice on one class in the
employers work force so that it can be measured ... By contrast,
Pouncy has not shown, nor can he show, that independent of other
factors the employment practices he challenges have caused the
racial imbalance in Prudential's work force. The statistics presented
by the appellant do show that, on the whole, blacks are over-
represented in the lower levels of Prudential's work force. But this
might result from any number of causes. Absent proof that the
disparate impact is caused by one of the challenged employment
practices, we do not require the employer to justify the legitimacy
of any (or all) employment practices. In sum, the nature of the
evidence presented by the appellant at trial could not establish a
case of employment discrimination based on the disparate impact
model.' 4
The "nature of the evidence presented"' 13 was the basis for the decision,
not the nature of the challenged practices. Plaintiff Pouncy did establish that
a disparity existed in Prudential's work force and that certain practices were
utilized in the selection process. The court found that Pouncy failed to establish
any causal connection between the challenged practices and the disparity. As
the court put it, "it is clear that Pouncy has not shown that a facially neutral
employment practice used by Prudential falls more harshly on black
employees."' 36 The court went on to explain that aptitude tests, height and
weight requirements and "similar selection criteria" all may be shown to af-
fect one class of employees more harshly than another. In Griggs, for example,
133. See, e.g., Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1982); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th
Cir. 1983); Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d
456 (5th Cir. 1986); and cases cited supra at note 10.
134. 668 F.2d at 801-02.
135. Id. at 801.
136. Id.
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the plaintiff showed not just a racial imbalance in the work force but also
that the educational requirement disqualified a higher percentage of blacks
than whites. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,137 the height and weight requirement
was shown to disqualify a disproportionate number of women. In Pouncy,
the plaintiff failed to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the
challenged selection practices disqualified a disproportionate number of blacks.
The court did not hold that because the challenged selection practices were
not identified, objective and facially neutral they could not be shown to have
caused the adverse impact but rather in this case, they had not been shown
to have such impact.
As discussed earlier, a number of alternative statistical analyses may be
utilized by a plaintiff to establish the adverse impact of selection devices. Where
applicant flow data are available, the "causation" problem which was critical
in Pouncy is eliminated. Where applicant flow data are used, the nature of
the impact evidence will be that individuals flowing through the challenged
procedure are disqualified in racially disproportionate numbers. The statistical
evidence presented in Pouncy was problematic only because the plaintiff, rely-
ing on a work force/labor market analysis, 38 failed to establish a causal con-
nection between the challenged practices and the work force imbalances. The
plaintiff's reliance on work force/labor market analysis rather than applicant
flow analysis left the court unwilling to conclude that the work force disparities
were caused by the challenged practices and not by any number of other
factors.139 Had the evidence presented shown more directly the connection
between the challenged practices and the work force disparity, by demonstrating
the system's exclusionary effect, or by eliminating the likelihood that the
disparities were caused by factors other than those challenged, the court would
have been better able to make a finding regarding the effect of the challenged
practices."' 0
137. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
138. See supra note 132.
139. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has addressed this problem in a similar manner,
but without closing the door on the use of disparate impact theory. In Latinos Unidos De Chelsea
En Accion v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986), the court noted that it was un-
necessary to decide whether the disparate impact model may ever apply in cases involving subjec-
tive job criteria because plaintiffs had not identified any specific employment practice or policy
(objective or subjective) that allegedly caused a discriminatory impact on minorities. Rather than
ruling that subjective practices could not be challenged, the court appropriately found that plain-
tiffs had not done so effectively. Similarly, in Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1015
(Ist Cir. 1984), the court noted that the challenged layoff selection guidelines were characterized
by "excessive subjectivity," but saw no need to decide whether such cases should be decided
exclusively under a disparate treatment rather than a disparate impact theory because the plain-
tiffs had not established the discriminatory impact at issue. In Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d
1539, 1549 (1lth Cir. 1985), the court, applying disparate impact analysis in a challenge to sub-
jective practices, found that impact had not been established because "a static, descriptive summary
such as this reflects little more than the racial distribution of the work force... on conveniently
chosen days."
140. Clearly, unless applicant flow data are unreliable or unavailable, the statistical showing
required to establish the disparate impact of any decision-making process should focus on com-
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As to the multifaceted nature of the system challenged, the court expressed
a preference for application of disparate impact theory to cases where the
challenge is to a specifically identified practice rather than a non-specific
"multifaceted" system. That preference, however, should not be read as a
bar to disparate impact challenges to multifaceted systems generally. The
court's aversion to utilizing disparate impact analysis was clearly directed at
the problems associated with establishing causation and not with the
multifaceted nature of the process.'"' Where a multifaceted selection system
can be shown to produce discriminatory results, identification by the plaintiff
of a specific component of the system which causes the disparity becomes
logically unnecessary.
1 4 2
Logic notwithstanding, the Pouncy court asserted that identification of the
specific component of the process allegedly producing a work force disparity
was required to allocate fairly the parties' respective burdens of proof. The
court stated "we do not permit a plaintiff to challenge an entire range of
employment practices merely because the employer's work force reflects a racial
imbalance that might be causally related to any one or more of several prac-
tices .... ,"I, To do so, the court said, citing Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls,1'
would force the employer to validate components of its decisionmaking pro-
cess having no adverse effects.'45
The holding in Rivera, however, is not so broad. In Rivera, the plaintiffs
had identified the specific components of the process being challenged, and
the district court found the plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie
case as to three of the four identified components. 46 The district court found
parisons of the success rates of actual or potential candidates passing through the selection pro-
cedure rather than general population or labor market comparisons. Without such applicant flow
data, the Pouncy Court was unwilling to assume that the selection devices challenged actually
resulted in the general work force disparities shown. This observation however, is not meant
to suggest that a plaintiff should always be precluded from relying on work force/labor market
analysis to establish disparate impact. Indeed, there are situations in which applicant flow data
are simply unavailable. See D. ScaIEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCMUNATION LAW 1351
n.227 (2d ed. 1983). Where there are substantial disparities between the proportions of blacks
in the work force and the relevant labor pool a court may logically conclude that the screening
mechanism caused the observed imbalance, particularly where other likely causes of the imbalance
have been discounted. See supra note 59. Multiple regression analysis, typically utilized by plain-
tiffs in class disparate treatment cases, may be helpful in discounting the effects of factors other
than the practices challenged. See generally D. BALDus & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF
DISCRIMNATION § 8.021 (1980).
141. The court stated that "[a]lthough some courts have used the disparate impact model
of proof to challenge multiple employment practices simultaneously (citation omitted), this is
an incorrect use of the model. The disparate impact model applies only when an employer has
instituted a specific procedure, usually a selection criterion for employment, that can be shown
to have a causal connection to a class based imbalance in the work force." Pouncy, 668 F.2d
at 800. (emphasis added).
142. See supra note 54.
143. 668 F.2d at 801.
144. 665 F.2d at 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1982).
145. 668 F.2d at 801.
146. Challenged were a written test, a physical agility test, a background investigation and
a job performance assessment.
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that the only component shown to have had an adverse impact, the written
examination, was valid. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that despite the finding
that the other three components had no impact, the district court should have
analyzed the selection process as a whole for adverse impact. The court of
appeals stated that "such an approach might be appropriate if the effect of
the individual elements in the selection process cannot be isolated, but a
disparate impact can be shown to arise from the procedures' completion." ,47
The court pointed out, however, that "[t]he burden of determining the validity
of a screening procedure ... will not be imposed where proof of an absence




Where there is proof of the discriminatory effect of the total selection pro-
cess and no evidence of the absence of discriminatory effect attributable to
individual components, a prima facie case of disparate impact is appropriately
made on proof as to the effect of the total selection process.' 4 9 Where an
employer utilizes a decisionmaking system that is composed of numerous
criteria, and data are available which would allow for isolation of the system's
several components and their impact, it is appropriate to expect a plaintiff
to identify the component, or combination of components, to be challenged.
Such an identification of the challenged components would allow for an
analysis of their actual effects, and render the analysis more probative in
establishing the relationship between each isolated practice and the prohibited
impact each is alleged to produce. Liberal use of discovery and complete record
keeping by employers'"0 may in some cases allow a plaintiff to develop the
information necessary to identify each component causing or contributing to
the impact. Where a plaintiff is unable to identify the offending component
or where the adverse impact is produced by the combination of multiple com-
ponents, isolation of a specific offending component should not be required.
Well-settled evidentiary principles would dictate that in this situation, the
burden must be placed on the only party to the litigation with ready access
to knowledge of the facts in question-the employer.'
147. 665 F.2d at 539.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also infra note 240.
150. See UGESP, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(C), 1607.15(A)(2) (1988), for federal record keeping
requirements. Because these provisions do not require employers to maintain information regard-
ing the impact of the individual components of a selection process unless the total process pro-
duces a disparate impact (see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15(A)(2) (1988)), it is likely that such information
will not be available to a plaintiff in all cases.
151. See E. CLEARY, McCoRMCK'S HANDBooK OF THE LAw oF EVIDENCE, § 337 at 950 (3d
ed. 1984) ("where the facts with regard to an issue are peculiarly in the knowledge of a party
that party has the burden of proving the issue"); F. JARMas & G. HAzARD, CIVnL PROCEDURE
§ 7.8 at 324 (3d ed. 1985) ("the burden of proof is frequently placed on the party with readier
access to knowledge about the fact in question"); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (one of the purposes of Title VII is to force employers to bring their employment
processes into the open), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). See also 9 J. WiOMoRE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2486 at 290 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 354, 359 n.45.
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In short, where a plaintiff can establish the disparate impact of a multifaceted
selection process, the employer (the party in possession of the data) has the
opportunity in rebuttal to isolate the various components of its process and
identify those not contributing to the prohibited impact." 2 This approach
relieves the plaintiff of the heavy burden of isolating the effects of components
of which he may not be aware, and allows the employer to limit its burden
to establishing the business necessity of only those components resulting in
a disparate impact." 3
The Pouncy court, then, in reaching an appropriate result, utilized language
that spawned a string of misguided progeny. To understand the misdirection
of the courts that have "followed" Pouncy, it is helpful to understand the
apparent source of the Pouncy court's misdirection.
Where the Pouncy Court Went Wrong
The Pouncy court could easily have limited its discussion to the failure of
the plaintiff to establish a causal connection between the challenged practices
and the work force disparity shown. 5 Instead, the court focused its discus-
sion on the nature of the challenged practices rather than the plaintiff's failure
to establish their effects. This approach was neither necessary to a determina-
tion of the issues raised in the case, nor the legal basis for the decision.'m5
The court took the position that disparate impact analysis is only applicable
in situations where specific facially neutral practices are challenged and,
significantly, that the practices challenged there were not amenable to such
analysis.' 6 The court, in coming to that conclusion, relied on A. & L.
152. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) ("if the employer discerns fallacies or
deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing evidence
of his own"); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The Segar Court stated:
The employer will possess knowledge far superior to that of the plaintiff as to
precisely how its employment practices affect employees. This fact traditionally
justifies placing on the defendant the burden of proving the business necessity of
an employment practice. So too it justifies the lesser burden of requiring the employer
to articulate which of its employment practices adversely affect minorities ....
[A] requirement that the plaintiff in every case pinpoint at the outset the employ-
ment practices that cause an observed disparity between those who appear to be
comparably qualified . .. in effect permits challenges only to readily perceptible
barriers; it allows subtle barriers to continue to work their discriminatory effects,
and thereby thwarts the crucial national purpose that Congress sought to effec-
tuate in Title VII.
Id.
153. Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D. D.C. 1981); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628
F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980); Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1982).
154. See supra note 132.
155. See Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VTI's Disparate Impact
Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 869, 882.
156. The Pouncy court in fact, did not state generally that subjective practices are not facially
neutral. The court noted only that the practices challenged by plaintiff were not "akin to the
'facially neutral employment practices' the disparate impact model was designed to test." 668
F.2d at 801.
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Larson,' 1 who specifically and with no explanation asserted that subjective
practices are inappropriate for disparate impact analysis because they are not
",neutral.",151
A logical reading of the term "facial neutrality" as first utilized in Griggs
shows that it means nothing more than that the challenged device is, on its
face, not race related. Where the employer uses a selection device that is on
its face related to race, i.e., not facially neutral, then the employer is engaged
in intentional discrimination and the practice is scrutinized under the disparate
treatment theory. In such situations, there is no need to consider the effects
of the device since individuals excluded because of its racial nature clearly
have been treated differently based on racial considerations. Where the
employer uses a device that is not on its face related to race, i.e., facially
neutral, then the court looks to the effects of using that device unless there
is evidence that the employer has applied its facially neutral device differently
on the basis of race. 1 9 If the device is applied equally to all, but there is
a racial effect, the use of the device must be justified by business necessity.
The issue is that simple. The question is whether a decisionmaking process
that depends upon the subjective judgment of those controlling the process
can be facially neutral.
While it is true that courts which have found the use of subjectivity to
violate Title VII have criticized such practices as "suspect" because they pro-
vide ready mechanisms for intentional discrimination,160 that characterization
does not render them non-neutral on their faces. The notion that a selection
device cannot be "suspect" and "facially neutral" at the same time is flawed."'
To suggest that the exercise of discretion is not facially neutral in a race
discrimination context is to suggest that there exists an inference of inten-
tional discrimination whenever discretionary judgments are made by whites
regarding blacks. While there are many who would support such an observa-
tion as an accurate, contemporary social comment, it is obviously unaccept-
able as a rule of law. In all fairness to the employer, all employment practices
must be presumed to be "facially neutral" unless there is evidence leading
a reasonable observer to conclude they are related to race.' 62 The subjective
decisions of individual decisionmakers then, even though suspect, should be
viewed on their faces as neutral and nondiscriminatory until some evidence
is presented to the contrary. The evidence required at the prima facie stage
in treatment cases would counter the presumption of neutrality and establish
157. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 73.00 (1981 and Supp. 1988).
158. Id. at § 76.34 (1987).
159. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 125.
161. See, e.g., Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1984). Cf. Rossini
v. Ogilvy & Mather, 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986) (court stating that it is logically impossible
to have it both ways).
162. Such evidence could take the form of that required at the prima facie stage in individual
disparate treatment cases (see supra text accompanying notes 20-33), or in class disparate treat-
ment cases (see supra text accompanying notes 34-49).
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a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination. Similarly, in impact
cases, the practice of allowing the exercise of discretion must be presumed
to be facially neutral. The fact that courts have viewed subjective decision-
making practices as suspect should not strip such practices of their presumed
neutrality.
The Pouncy court also noted that the kinds of selection devices challenged
were not the kinds of devices to which the disparate impact model has tradi-
tionally been applied. While the court was partially correct in that observa-
tion,' 63 it took liberties in suggesting that the devices were not akin to the
devices the disparate impact model was designed to test. The types of devices
the disparate impact model was designed to test, as set forth in Griggs and
its progeny, are those devices that "produce a disparate impact on a pro-
tected group."' 64 Subjective decisionmaking is not inherently unable to pro-
duce a disparate impact.' 6 The practice clearly falls within the ambit of facially
neutral devices which can produce adverse effects. Further, the Griggs deci-
sion does not suggest that the Court intended to limit the application of
disparate impact theory to objective standards.166 The mere fact that the selec-
tion practices challenged in Griggs were "overt, clearly identified, nondiscre-
tionary [and] ... applied at a single point in the selection process ' ' 67 pro-
vides no justification for limiting the broad language used in Griggs to the
narrow circumstances extant there. 68 This is particularly so in light of the
broad legislative purposes of Title VII to "achieve equality of opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees."'6 9
It has been suggested that footnote seven in Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters7 0 supports the notion that discretionary decisionmaking should be
exempted from impact analysis.' 7' In Furnco, the defendant construction com-
163. See supra note 131.
164. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (those that "operate
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups"); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 584 (1979) (those that have "the effect of denying members of one race equal access to
employment opportunities").
165. See Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983) (court criticizing
the obviously discriminatory effects of the challenged subjective practices).
166. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
167. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800.
168. The Griggs court, in describing the kinds of practices to which disparate impact theory
applied, used such terms as "practices, procedures, or tests" (401 U.S. at 430), "practice" (401
U.S. at 431), "employment procedures or testing mechanisms" (401 U.S. at 343), and "any
given requirement" (401 U.S. at 432).
169. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31 ("removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers
to employment"). See also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County Calif., 480 U.S.
616 (1987) ("eliminat[e] the effects of discrimination in the work place").
170. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
171. See, e.g., A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 157, at § 76.32; Cooper, Title VII in
the Academy: Barriers to Equality for Faculty Women, 16 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 795, 992 (1983);
Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NomR D~im L. REv. 318, 348
n.167 (1987); Heward v. Western Elec. Co., 35 F.E.P. Cases 807 (10th Cir. 1984).
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pany had a policy of only hiring bricklayers known by the job superintendent
to be experienced and competent. No applications were accepted at the job
site. Three black bricklayers who had attempted to secure employment at the
job site challenged the practice as discriminatory. The district court found
the plaintiffs had not proved a claim under impact theory because the policy
did not result in a disparate impact. The plaintiffs failed under treatment theory
because the policy constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
failure to hire. The court of appeals reversed, holding that plaintiffs who were
qualified, had applied and were rejected, had made out a prima facie case
under treatment theory which had not been rebutted.' The appellate court
then devised a new hiring process for the company which included taking
applications at the job site and comparing those candidates against those known
to the superintendent.173 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider
whether the court of appeals had gone too far in substituting its own judg-
ment as to proper hiring practices . . . ."I
At footnote seven, the Supreme Court noted its agreement with the court
of appeals that disparate treatment theory was appropriately applied to the
facts in that case.'"7 The Supreme Court commented at footnote seven that
"this case did not-involve employment tests ... nor particularized requirements
such as height and weight specifications ... nor was this a pattern and prac-
tice case . . "76 The Larsons assert that the Court was suggesting by this
footnote that disparate impact theory is only applicable to devices such as
those described.' This conclusion, however, is not called for by the footnote
read in context.
The court of appeals in Waters v. Furnco Construction Corp.'" noted: This
was not a case, like Griggs, of comparing white and black applicants by ob-
jective, but irrelevant standards, and rejecting more blacks, proportionally,
than whites. The qualifications of [plaintiffs] were never compared with either
the black bricldayers who filled the small proportion of jobs, nor the white
bricklayers who filled the great majority of the jobs.'1 9 The facts revealed
no adverse impact because blacks were selected in excess proportion to their
availability in the relevant labor market.' 80 The challenge in Furnco then was
to a selection device that operated to exclude from consideration qualified
applicants who were black and white and keep open the selection process
172. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1977).
173. Id.
174. Furnco, 438 U.S., at 574.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 575 n.7.
177. A. LARsoN & L. LARSON, supra note 157, at § 76.32.
178. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977).
179. Id. at 1089-90.
180. While there was a factual dispute over the proportion of blacks in the relevant labor
force, ranging from 5.7% to 13.7%, the district court found the figure to be 5.7%. Furnco's
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for the consideration of black and white applicants who were no better
qualified. The court of appeals reasoned that "vis-a-vis the white bricklayers
employed .... racial discrimination is established under the principle of
McDonnell-Douglas."' I The court commented that the Griggs principle could
not be turned around to establish the absence of discrimination where disparate
treatment was at issue.'8 2 The plaintiffs were 1) of a racial minority, 2) qualified
and applied, 3) rejected despite their qualification and 4) the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants of the plaintiffs
qualifications. The claim of the individual plaintiffs was that, on the basis
of race, they were treated differently than similarly situated whites. The court
of appeals' reference to disparate impact theory was only to clarify that the
plaintiffs' theory was one of treatment and that the defendant's defensive
effort to utilize impact theory was inappropriate.
Commentators have suggested that the dissenting opinion of Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan in Furnco recognizes and challenges a suggestion by the
majority that the practices at issue were not facially neutral.' 83 This conclu-
sion misreads both the majority and the dissent. The majority did not hold
that the practices challenged were not facially neutral. Rather, as the dissent
points out, it assumed the court of appeals affirmed the district court's find-
ing that there was no adverse impact and, consequently, the disparate impact
theory did not apply.'84 According to the dissent, that assumption was un-
supported because the court of appeals disposed of the case under a disparate
treatment theory. What the dissent suggested is that the plaintiffs on remand
should not be precluded from attempting to prove their case under disparate
impact theory since the question of its applicability was not resolved by the
court below. Neither the court of appeals, the majority, nor the dissent in
Furnco focused on the facial neutrality of the challenged practice as a basis
for determining which theory of discrimination to apply.
The real question posed by the Pouncy decision is not whether subjective
selection devices are facially neutral, but whether they can be shown to have
an adverse impact on a protected group. If so, disparate impact analysis is
appropriate. The conclusion that subjective selection devices cannot be shown
to have an adverse impact is not supportable. An employer who utilizes a
system under which a particular employment decision is based on the subjec-
tive judgment of a supervisory employee is engaged in an employment
practice-that of relying on the judgment of its supervisors. Assuming that
100 black and 100 white comparably qualified individuals are processed through
such a system for placement in 100 vacant positions, the system clearly would
have an adverse impact on blacks if, after the 200 went through the process,
95 whites and 5 blacks were selected. Any rule that would preclude a plaintiff
from proceeding under traditional disparate impact theory and require proof
181. Id. at 1090.
182. Id. at 1089.
183. A. LARsON & L. LARSON, supra note 157, § 76.32.
184. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 584.
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of intentional discrimination would frustrate the purposes of Title VII. The
supervisor may be engaged in intentional discrimination, but proof of that
intentional discrimination is logically unnecessary under Title VII where "Con-
gress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, not simply the motivation.""'
Pouncy and Its Misguided Progeny
A number of courts have relied on Pouncy's observation that the disparate
impact model traditionally had not been applied to the challenged selection
devices as support for the proposition that disparate impact analysis is not
available in instances where the plaintiff's challenge is to subjective criteria.",
For example, in Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., ' the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on Pouncy, stated flatly that "because
the classification and referral practices complained of effectively turn on discre-
tionary decisions, they do not fall within the category of facially neutral pro-
cedures to which the disparate impact model is traditionally applied."' 88 The
court then applied the more rigid burden of proof imposed on plaintiffs under
the disparate treatment model, finding a prima facie case had not been
established.' 89
The challenged practices in Pegues were the classification and referral prac-
tices of the Mississippi State Employment Service (MSES). The MSES func-
tioned as a labor exchange, matching qualified applicants with available jobs.
On the initial visit, each applicant was referred to an interviewer who handled
job codes which corresponded to the job preferences expressed by the appli-
cant. Based on questioning about the applicant's education, training, ex-
perience, interests and skills, the interviewer assigned "the appropriate" code
to the candidate's application."90 Interviewers were also responsible for match-
ing applicants with employer job orders. The plaintiffs claimed that these in-
terviewers abused their discretion in coding and referring, and they presented
evidence of the disproportionate classification of blacks and women in
"stereotypic, less remunerative occupations . . . ."9 The Fifth Circuit,
however, in reviewing the evidence under the disparate treatment model,
decided that the statistical showing was insufficient to establish the plaintiffs'
prima facie case "where a strong inference of discrimination has [not]
previously been raised."' 92 Had the analysis proceeded under disparate im-
pact theory, the challenge could have been viewed as against the process. Also,
185. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
186. See supra note 10.
187. 699 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
188. Id. at 765.
189. Id. at 768,
190. Id. at 764.
191. Id. at 766-67. For example, ninety black women and one white woman with at least
an eighth grade education were coded for domestic labor.
192. Id. at 768.
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because of the substantial disparity in code assignments, the defendant would
have been required to justify that process.
Similarly, in Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin University,"3 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
according to Pouncy, a subjective classification practice that
depends on the employer's discretionary decisions is not included
within the category of facially neutral procedures-such as the high
school educational requirements in this case-whose discriminatory
impact may be isolated and thus specifically shown to have a causal
connection to a class based imbalance in the work force so as to
require no further proof of discriminatory motivation or intent. 
194
Although the court seemed to notice the illogic of its reading of Pouncy, it
viewed itself as bound by that reading, stating:
Were this a case of first impression in this court, we would likewise
have concluded that the other channeling practices likewise fell
clearly under the disparate impact model, under the literal terms
of section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(2), since
they 'limit, segregate, or classify, employees in a manner that 'would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee'
because of race or sex ... Nevertheless, . . . a decision of this
Court, Pouncy ... now requires that the discriminatory treatment
model, requiring proof of discriminatory intent, be applied in deter-
mining whether the obviously disparate effects of the other two
channeling practices-systematic assignment of lower compensated
employment to blacks and women ... , and the use of subjectiv-
ity in implementation of job qualifications for initial job assign-
ment and promotion and the placement of employees on the com-
pensation scale-nevertheless reflected race and gender discrimina-
tion prohibited by Title VII. 193
Similarly, in Carroll v. Sears,196 the Fifth Circuit stated that "the use of sub-
jective criteria to evaluate employees in hiring and job placement decisions
is not within the category of facially neutral procedures to which the disparate
impact model is applied."' 97
Many other circui's have relied on Pouncy to avoid application of disparate
impact theory in challenges to subjective decisionmaking systems.' 98 The Ninth
193. 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983).
194. Id. at 620.
195. Id.
196. 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983).
197. Id. at 188.
198. An example is the Fourth Circuit's holdings in EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d
633 (4th Cir. 1983). See also Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1982) and Stansky
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Circuit's confusion during the early 1980's is particularly instructive. In
Heagney v. University of Washington,' and O'Brien v. Sky Chefs,"' the
Ninth Circuit showed a predilection towards the misreading of Pouncy. Two
later cases, however, indicated the court's disagreement with that approach.
In Wang v. Hoffman,2"' and in Peters v. Lieullen0 2 the court clearly sug-
gested that disparate impact analysis was appropriately applied to subjective
decisionmaking. In 1985, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected Wang and Peters
in Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,203 and held that the challenged
practices-lack of well defined job criteria and subjective decisionmaking
among others-were not specific facially neutral practices suitable for disparate
impact analysis. Finally, in 1987, the court en banc in Antonio0 4 resolved
the conflict, holding that "disparate impact analysis may be applied to
challenge subjective employment practices or criteria provided the plaintiffs
have proved a causal connection between those practices and the demonstrated
impact on members of a protected class .... We are persuaded that this
holding comports with the express language of the statute, the intent of Con-
gress. . . ,the enforcement agencies' interpretation, and the broad prophylatic
purposes of Title VII. $
2 5
Other courts of appeals have recognized the incompatibility with well-
accepted Title VII principles that a rigid adherence to the widespread
misreading of Pouncy entails. 201 Significantly, in Page v. U.S. Industries,
Inc. 21 7 even the Fifth Circuit, without reversing Pouncy, attempted to minimize
the negative effects of its misapplication by reading it as permitting the ap-
plication of disparate treatment analysis to subjective criteria, and not as
precluding the application of disparate impact analysis. In Page, the court
stated:
In light of our recent decisions in Pouncy and Pegues, we con-
clude that this case can be analyzed under the disparate treatment
theory. However, we note, as did the District Court, that either
theory may be applied to the same set of facts .... It is clear
that a promotional system which is based upon subjective selec-
tion criteria is not discriminatory per se. Consequently, such a
system can be facially neutral but yet be discriminatorily applied
so that it impacts adversely on one group. 08
Citing the Fifth Circuit's cases applying impact analysis to subjective selec-
199. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
200. 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982).
201. 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982).
202. 746 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
203. 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985).
204. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
205. Id. at 1482.
206. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 11.
207. 726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1984).
208. Id. at 1045-46.
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tion devices, the court went on to "agree with the district court's assessment
that [the] subjective promotional system in this case indeed may have had
a class wide impact. ' 20 9 The defendant's subjective promotional system was
then analyzed under the disparate impact model.
The Page panel's effort to minimize the negative effect of Pouncy was short
lived. In Bunch v. Bullard,210 and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co.,
the Fifth Circuit indicated a reluctance to deviate from the precedent set by
Pouncy. In Watson, the court noted:
As stated by this Court in Carpenter, 'were this a case of first
impression in this court, we would likewise have concluded that
the other [challenged practices] .. fell clearly under the disparate
impact model, .... since they 'limit, segregate, or classify'
employees in a manner that 'would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities. . .' because of race...'
[citations omitted]. Nevertheless, this is not a case of first impres-
sion, and this court is constrained by Pouncy and its progeny to
apply disparate treatment analysis to Watson's claims."'
In none of these cases has a court set forth a convincing analysis support-
ing the conclusion that impact analysis should be unavailable where a plain-
tiff challenges subjective selection practices. Courts have pointed to the prob-
lem of establishing causation where the challenge is to a multifaceted system,
but, as noted earlier, this problem does not justify an absolute bar to such
challenges, but rather suggests a need for a more refined statistical analysis.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watson to resolve this obvious
confusion. As is shown in the next section, the Court went far beyond resolu-
tion of the question whether challenges to subjective decisionmaking can be
analyzed under disparate impact theory. The Court held that impact analysis
was applicable in such situations, but went further to alter impact analysis
in such a way as to render it practically indistinguishable in theory from
disparate treatment analysis and, therefore, practically useless to plaintiffs.
Watson: a "Fresh and Somewhat Closer Examination"
The Supreme Court, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co.2"3 pro-
vides some guidance to the lower courts regarding what it views as the ap-
propriate analysis to utilize in challenges to subjective employment practices.
In Watson, the plaintiff, a black female, was hired by the defendant, Forth
Worth Bank and Trust, as a proof operator. After approximately three years,
she was promoted to a position as teller in the bank's drive-in facility. Ap-
209. Id. at 1046.
210. 795 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1986).
211. 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
212. 798 F.2d 791, 797 n.12 (5th Cir. 1986).
213. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
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proximately four years later, she sought a supervisory teller position. A white
male was selected. The plaintiff then sought a position as supervisor of the
drive-in bank. A white female was selected. After serving informally as assis-
tant to the supervisor of tellers, the plaintiff again sought the supervisory
teller position when the white male in the position was promoted. The white
female who was then supervisor of the drive-in bank was selected for the posi-
tion. The plaintiff then sought the vacated position as supervisor of the drive-in
bank, but a white male was selected. The bank had no formal criteria for
evaluating candidates for promotion. Instead, it relied on the subjective judg-
ment of supervisors in determining a candidate's fitness for promotion.
Watson filed suit in the district court alleging the bank had unlawfully
discriminated against blacks in a number of areas, including hiring and pro-
motion. The district court held that Watson was not a proper representative
of the class of black applicants, but it nonetheless addressed the merits of
the case. The court found the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case
of hiring discrimination because the percentage of blacks in the work force
approximated the percentage of blacks in the metropolitan area in which the
bank was located.21' As to the plaintiff's promotion claim, the district court,
applying individual disparate treatment analysis, found that a prima facie case
had been made. However, the court held the bank had met its burden by
presenting evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for each
challenged promotion decision, and the plaintiff had not demonstrated those
reasons to be pretexts for racial discrimination.
21
1
The plaintiff appealed claiming that the district court erred in failing to
apply the disparate impact analysis to her promotion claims.2 '" The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings.217 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute whether
disparate impact theory may be applied to subjective decisionmaking processes.
214. The court of appeals vacated this judgment and remanded the case to the district court
to dismiss the applicant claims without prejudice. The court recognized the prejudice to the class
that might result from deciding the class issue without a proper representative, and expressed
reservations about the district court's use of population statistics rather than applicant flow data
to determine the question whether the employer's hiring practices resulted in a disparate impact.
See supra note 140.
215. 798 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1986).
216. Interestingly, it is questionable whether a prima facie case could have been made on the
evidence presented at trial, had the district court applied disparate impact analysis. The evidence
indicated that during the relevant time period, only fifteen blacks had been employed by the
bank and only one black other the plaintiff had ever applied for promotions that were given
to whites. Memorandum Opinion of District Court at 13 (Nov. 21, 1984). It is questionable
whether such data could establish a prima facie case of disparate impact since the sample size
was so small as to render any conclusion suspect. See supra note 61. On this basis, amici sug-
gested that the Supreme Court dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted. See Brief for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., The Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., The Employment Law Center, and the Center for Law in the Public
Interest as Amici Curiae at 3.
217. 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
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The Court began its analysis with a general description of disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact theories. It is here the Court began to blur the
critical distinction between the two theories, stating:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically
dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate
legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment
analysis is used [citation omitted]. Nor do we think it is appropriate
to hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination on the
basis of less evidence than is required to prove intentional
discrimination. Rather, the necessary premise of the disparate im-
pact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without
a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be func-
tionally equivalent to intentional discrimination."'8
In suggesting that the ultimate legal issue to be decided under the two theories
is no different, the Court seriously understated the traditional significance
of intent. Under disparate treatment theory, the employer is liable because
her employment decision was intentionally discriminatory. Under disparate
impact theory, the employer is liable because the practices unjustifiably pro-
duced a discriminatory result. While there may be some functional equivalence
in that under both theories the end result of employer action must be
discrimination, the factual issue of intent has traditionally been irrelevant in
impact cases. This is because the courts have consistently found employer
practices unlawfully discriminatory where they produce a discriminatory result
without adequate justification. Under treatment analysis, the ultimate legal
question of unlawful discrimination cannot be resolved against the employer
without a factual finding as to intent. While the ultimate legal question may
be the same under both theories, the factual basis for resolving that question
has always been significantly different.
The Court's comparison of the quantum of evidence required under the
two theories, then, is misleading. It is not a matter of holding a defendant
liable on the basis of less evidence, but rather different evidence. There is
a clear basis for holding a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination
on the basis of this different evidence. That basis is the fundamental difference
in the factual questions to be answered. The functional equivalence of employer
practices as reflected in the end result does not eliminate the difference in
the factual questions to be resolved under the two theories.
The Court used the functional equivalence of the two theories as reflected
in the end result as the basis for finding impact theory applicable to subjec-
tive systems. Noting that an "undisciplined system of subjective decisionmak-
ing" may have the "same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible in-
tentional discrimination," 2 '9 the Court held that "subjective or discretionary
218. 108 S. Ct. at 2785.
219. Id. at 2786.
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employment practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach
in appropriate cases." 220 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that
limiting disparate impact theory to standardized selection practices would allow
employers to "insulate themselves from liability" under impact theory by
simply adding a subjective component to an otherwise objective system and
rendering the system subjective.2 ' The Court also noted: "[D]isparate im-
pact analysis is in principle no less applicable to subjective employment criteria
than to objective or standardized tests. In either case, a facially neutral prac-
tice, adopted without discriminatory intent, may have effects that are in-
distinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices. 2 22 After deciding
that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective practices, however,
the plurality,2 3 in dicta, turned to the evidentiary standards that should apply
in such cases.
2 24
The Watson plurality was persuaded by the defendant's argument225 that
applying traditional disparate impact theory as developed in Griggs, Dothard
and Albemarle, would result in the employer's adoption of "surreptitious quota
systems" to prevent plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case. 26 This
result, in the plurality's view, would run counter to congressional intent in
enacting section 2000e-20) of the Act, and would perhaps violate the Con-
stitution.
2 7
Section 2000e-2(j) provides that
nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any
employer ... to grant preferential treatment ... on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
of percentage of persons of any race ... employed by any employer
220. Id. at 2787.
221. Id. at 2786.
222. Id. Here, the Court accepts the notion that use of subjective employment criteria is a
facially neutral practice. Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text.
223. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White and Scalia.
224. As pointed out by Justice Stevens (108 S. Ct. at 2797) and Justices Blackmun, Brennan
and Marshall (108 S. Ct. at 2792 n.1), there was no need to announce a new interpretation
of disparate impact theory in order to resolve the narrow question on which certiorari was granted.
225. This argument was advanced also by the U.S. Department of Justice and other amici.
Id. at 2786. See also Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does Discriminatory Impact Analysis
Apply?, 25 SA DiEGo L. Rnv. 63, 69-70 (1980).
226. 108 S. Ct. at 2787. Some consider the possibility that application of traditional impact
theory to subjective systems will encourage meaningful affirmative action to be positive. See
Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 H~Auv. L. Rv. 945, 1026-27 (1982);
Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 Cm.-KENT L.
Rav. 1, 28 (1987). Others question the legitimacy of such a result. See Maltz, Title VII and
Upper Level Employment-A Response to Prof. Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 776, 784-85 (1983).
The plurality finds it unacceptable. In the author's view, speculation regarding a possible illegal
response to a legal standard should not serve as the primary justification for a relaxation of
that legal standard. The threat by employers that in order to avoid liability under disparate im-
pact theory, they are likely to resort to the inappropriate use of quotas should, rather that prompt
a change in the legal standard allegedly causing that response, prompt stronger enforcement of
the prohibitions against the response.
227. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
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... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons
of such race ... in any community ... or in the available work
force in any community . ... 228
Clearly, the purpose of section 2000e-2(j) was to prevent courts from making
findings of unlawful discrimination based solely on the fact that protected
groups were underutilized in an employer's work force and then requiring
preferential treatment as a remedy for such findings.22 9 A finding of unlawful
discrimination would be unsupported without some evidence that the
underutilization shown was attributable to some employer action.1
3
1
Congress' prohibition against interpreting Title VII to require the use of
preferential treatment is limited to situations in which the requirement is "on
account of an imbalance" as evidenced through a work force/labor market
comparison alone since a conclusion that such an imbalance resulted from
employer practices is not inevitable. Where discriminatory impact is shown
through one of the many other statistical techniques available, or where there
is a finding that the imbalance was caused by employer practices,' section
2000e-2(j) is, by its language, inapplicable. Courts may require preferential
treatment as a remedy for discriminatory conduct 232 and employers are per-
mitted to engage in preferential treatment even without a finding of discrimina-
tion where evidence exists of a "conspicuous" or "manifest" racial im-
balance. 23 Moreover, even if section 2000e-20) can be read so broadly as
to prohibit preferential treatment based on evidence of prior discrimination,
it does not prohibit utilization of a well-established theory of proof that could,
in the words of the plurality, "put undue pressure on ' 234 employers to engage
in preferential treatment. Section 2000e-2(j) provides no justification for a
redefinition of disparate impact theory.
Nevertheless, the plurality further explained how its "fresh and somewhat
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20). The plurality cites this section of Title VII as support for the
proposition that Congress did not "require employers to avoid 'disparate impact' as such." The
Court in its prior decisions however, has reached exactly the opposite conclusion. It is clear
that the disparate impact theory was formulated for the purpose of eliminating unjustified prac-
tices that had a disparate impact on protected groups. It is accurate then to say that Congress
did not require an employer's work force to mirror the general population. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). It is quite another thing
to suggest that Congress did not intend that employers avoid utilizing selection devices that pro-
duced an adverse impact on protected groups.
229. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205 n.5 (1979), the Court
described § 7030) as "speak[ing] to substantive liability under Title VII." See also Local 28
of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 464-65 n.37 (1986) ("legislative history con-
vinces us that 703(j) was added to Title VII to make clear that an employer ... does not engage
in 'discrimination' simply because of a racial imbalance in its work force").
230. See supra note 140.
231. Id.
232. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
233. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Johnson v. Transp. Agency of
Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
234. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
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closer examination of the constraints" of disparate impact theory "operates
to keep that analysis within its proper bounds." 2" In defining the "eviden-
tiary standards that apply in these cases," 23 6 the plurality first noted:
The plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond
the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the
employer's work force. The plaintiff must begin by identifying the
specific employment practice that is challenged .... Especially in
cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with the use
of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our
view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employ-
ment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed




This language, consistent with the view expressed in Pouncy, evidences a
desire for a fine tuning of the plaintiff's evidence by requiring more than
a generalized attack on a broad range of employment practices. 231 The language
does not, however, preclude an attack on a specific employment practice that
is composed of several component parts and is shown to have a disparate
impact.239 The plurality noted that where the employer combines subjective
criteria with more rigid standardized rules and tests, the plaintiff is responsi-
ble for identifying the specific employment practices allegedly responsible for
the observed disparities. To the extent that plaintiffs limit their showing of
impact to identified practices, the likelihood that the employer will be required
to justify components that do not contribute to the prohibited impact will
be minimized. This is an appropriate goal. In situations where the components
of the challenged procedure cannot so easily be isolated, however, or where
adverse effects are produced by the interaction of several components, re-
quiring plaintiffs to isolate individually the effects of specific components is
235. Id. at 2788.
236. Id. The plurality does not appear to intend that its new definition of impact theory apply
generally in all disparate impact cases. If the plurality had intended that its redefinition was
to apply more broadly than is indicated by the facts before it, surely it would have been more
clear. The possibility for broader application however, is not foreclosed since the plurality in-
dicates that it does "not believe that each verbal formulation used in our prior opinions to describe
the evidentiary standards in disparate impact cases is automatically applicable in light of today's
decision." Id. at 2788 n.2.
237. Id. at 2788. If the reference to Teal stands for the proposition that a plaintiff must isolate
and identify specific employment practices, it is inappropriate. Teal held that a plaintiff may
challenge the effect of isolated components even though the total process did not result in a
disparate impact. Teal did not hold that only isolated components may be challenged. See infra
note 240.
238. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
239. In the above quotation, the plurality refers both to plaintiff's responsibility for identify-
ing the "specific employment practice challenged" and "specific employment practices... respon-
sible for any observed disparities." Prior decisions leave little doubt, however, that a plaintiff
may challenge a practice that is composed of several component parts.
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not justified. Clearly the Court's "disparate impact cases consistently have
considered whether the result of an employer's total selection process had
an adverse impact upon the protected group.
240
Where data are available that would allow a plaintiff to isolate specific
components of a selection process and determine their impact, the plaintiff's
statistical case will be more probative if the impact of specific components
of the process are accounted for. Where such data are unavailable, however,
requiring the plaintiff to identify the specific component of the process caus-
ing the adverse impact would seriously undermine the goal of Title VII to
eliminate "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment.
' 2 4 1
Such an approach would require courts to ignore obvious disparate effects
until the plaintiff could identify one offensive component of the challenged
process.2 2 Similarly, where the plaintiff alleges that a combination of several
devices instead of a single component causes the impact, isolation of a single
component is inconsistent with the theory of plaintiff's case and should not
be required.
Consequently, where the plaintiff is either unable to isolate the impact of
individual components or is challenging their combined effects, as discussed
earlier, equity would require that the burden of justifying the process be shifted
to the employer.2 43 The employer, with its superior knowledge of how its system
works, is in a better position to isolate individual components of the system
and to demonstrate their impact or lack thereof.
2 4
The plurality further required that the plaintiff "offer statistical evidence
of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused
the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their member-
ship in a protected group." 40 The Court was unwilling to specify what kind
of evidence could justify an "inference of causation," leaving that decision
for a case-by-case analysis. 2 6 Clearly, something more than a simple utiliza-
tion analysis should be required in most disparate impact cases. 247 In cases
240. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
The majority in Teal repeatedly emphasized that any "barrier to employment opportunities"
could be challenged under disparate impact theory. 457 U.S. at 447-53. While disagreeing with
the Court's conclusion that the bottom line could not serve as a defense to a disparate impact
showing, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger, Rehnquist and O'Connor, clearly understood
that an impact showing could be made as to the total selection process. Of course, the majority
did not disagree on this point, but only held that the impact of the total selection process could
not serve as a defense to the adverse impact of an individual component on the employment
opportunities of individual members of the protected group.
241. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
242. Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988). See also supra note 155 and accom-
panying text.
243. See supra note 151.
244. See supra note 152.
245. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-89. The Court noted that the disparity in such cases need
not rise to the level of significance required in treatment cases. Cf. supra note 91.
246. Id. at 2789 n.3.
247. See supra note 140.
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challenging selection devices that are not objective qualifying standards (such
as the high school education requirement challenged in Griggs, or the height
and weight requirements challenged in Dothard), applicant flow analysis will
be more probative than a utilization analysis. In such cases, the causation
difficulties encountered by the Pouncy plaintiffs and noted by the Watson
plurality can be avoided." 8 Where applicant flow data are unavailable or
unreliable,24 9 a district court should retain the flexibility to find a causal con-
nection between employer practices and a work force disparity. This is par-
ticularly so where other apparent causes of the disparity have been eliminated
as probable causes.
250
The Watson plurality then stated its case too broadly when it concluded
that it was "unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover
and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical im-
balances in the composition of their work forces." 25' If limited to situations
in which the plaintiff's proof consists of a general work force/labor market
analysis, this conclusion might be appropriate. As was the problem in Pouncy,
where a plaintiff shows a disproportion between the composition of an
employer's work force and the composition of its labor pool without present-
ing evidence supporting an "inference of causation," a court may be justified
in refusing to make any assumptions regarding the cause of the disparity.
Where the plaintiffs' evidence of the impact of an employer's selection pro-
cess is sufficient to support a finding that the process resulted in the observed
disparity, the burden is appropriately shifted to the employer to offer a more
probative analysis identifying and justifying the specific components that caused
the result. 252 It is unrealistic to suppose that plaintiffs can discover and ex-
plain the myriad of employer practices that may lead to such imbalances.
Once the impact of the total process is shown, equity would require that the
employer shoulder the burden of explaining the role of its practices in caus-
ing that disparity.'
The plurality further confused disparate impact with disparate treatment
theory when it concluded it would be "unrealistic to assume that unlawful
discrimination is the sole cause" of work force disparities. 254 They suggest
that a finding of discrimination under impact theory requires an assumption
of unlawful discrimination, implying that employer intent is relevant. Under
248. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977) (applicant
flow data "very relevant" in determining whether a facially neutral device has a disparate impact).
249. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (applicant pool may fail to repre-
sent accurately the number of qualified minorities because of discriminatory recruitment prac-
tices). See also Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir. 1983); Wheeler
v. City of Columbus, 686 F.2d 1144, 1152 (5th Cir. 1982); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989,
1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
250. See supra note 140.
251. 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
252. See supra note 151.
253. See supra note 152.
254. 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
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disparate treatment theory, an employer's act performed on the basis of race
is "unlawful discrimination" without regard to its later consequences. Where
there is no direct evidence of a discriminatory act, proof of impact permits
the court to infer the existence of a preceding unlawfully discriminatory act.
A subtle but critical distinction between impact and treatment theory is that
under impact theory, the prohibited result renders the preceding act unlawfully
discriminatory. Under traditional impact theory, then, the court is not asked
to conclude that "unlawful discrimination" caused the disparity, only that
practices of the employer which cannot be justified caused the disparity and,
therefore, were unlawfully discriminatory.
The plurality's drift into disparate treatment theory is more clearly reflected
in its treatment of the respective burdens of proof in cases challenging sub-
jective decisionmaking under the disparate impact theory. Here, the plurality
engaged in its most significant departure from traditional disparate impact
analysis. Ordinarily, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to the business
necessity of the challenged practice.2" The Court, without distinguishing its
prior holdings, stated that "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimina-
tion against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment prac-
tice remains with the plaintiff at all times" and described the defendant's
burden as "producing evidence that its employment practices are based on
legitimate business reasons. ' 2 6 This alteration of traditional disparate im-
pact analysis was roundly criticized by Justices Blackmun, Brennan and
Marshall in their partial concurrence as "inconsistent with the proper eviden-
tiary standards and with the central purpose of Title VII." ' 2 7 They claimed
the plurality was "attempting to mimic the allocation of burdens the Court
has established in the very different context of individual disparate-treatment
claims" and turning "a blind eye to the crucial distinctions between the two
forms of claims.
' 258
The rebuttal burden placed on defendants by the plurality seems to fall
somewhere between a showing of business necessity and the articulation of
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Under individual disparate treatment
theory, the legitimate reason need not be related to business operations.
259
Under disparate impact theory, the use of the challenged practice must be
manifestly related to the employment in question. 260 The plurality's new for-
mulation does require that the employment practices challenged be based on
legitimate business reasons. Accordingly, the Court has neither completely
adopted the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason approach of traditional in-
dividual disparate treatment claims, nor completely abandoned the business
necessity approach of traditional disparate impact claims.
255. See supra note 78.
256. 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
257. Id. at 2792.
258. Id. at 2792-93.
259. See supra note 25.
260. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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The Court's reformulated language is consistent with the evolutionary
development of the business necessity defense. It is similar to the approach
taken by the Court in Beazer and Davis which recognized legitimate employer
concerns unrelated to actual job performance. In both of these cases the Court
accepted evidence that failed to establish clearly the manifest relationship be-
tween the challenged criteria and performance on the job in question, as
meeting the business necessity defense. The Court did, however, establish the
logical relationship between the criteria and legitimate business concerns of
the employer. The plurality's recognition of this expansion is justifiable. Its
effort to transform the defendant's rebuttal burden from what was a burden
of proof to a burden of production is, however, not justifiable.
Stating that the Griggs formulation of the defendant's burden "should not
be interpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of proof can be shifted
to the defendant" and that "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimina-
tion against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment prac-
tice remains with the plaintiff at all times,""'' the plurality correctly noted
that the plaintiff in impact cases bears the ultimate burden of proof on the
questions whether discrimination exists and whether employer actions caused
that discrimination. Traditionally, once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of discrimination by demonstrating that employer practices resulted in
a disparate impact, and the defendant meets its intermediate burden of prov-
ing business necessity, the plaintiff can meet its ultimate burden of proof only
by showing pretext. According to the plurality, however, when a plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and "when defendant has
met its burden of producing evidence that its employment practices are based
on legitimate business reasons," '262 the plaintiff must show pretext.
This development ignores the "crucial difference between a treatment and
an impact allegation ... the intermediate burden on the employer" of proving
that the challenged practices are required by business necessity.263 As the par-
tial concurrence pointed out, the purpose of the defendant's rebuttal in
disparate treatment cases is to rebut a presumption of intentional discrimina-
tion. To rebut that presumption, the defendant should only put the factual
question at issue. 264 The purpose of the defendant's rebuttal in disparate im-
pact cases is to "legitimize a practice that has the effect of excluding a pro-
tected class from job opportunities at a significantly disproportionate rate."1 6s
Once a prima facie case of disparate impact is made, "[tihe plaintiff already
has proved that the employment practice has an improper effect [and] it is
up to the employer to prove that the discriminatory effect is justified."2 66
261. 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
262. Id.
263. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1988); rev'd and
remanded 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). See also supra note 78.
264. 108 S. Ct. at 2793. See also supra note 25.
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The plurality's reformulation of the defendant's intermediate burden from
what has traditionally been a burden of proof to a burden of production
renders insignificant the fact that under traditional impact theory, evidence
of a disparate impact alone without proof of business necessity compels a
finding of unlawful discrimination.
The plurality's formulation has the practical effect of requiring plaintiffs
to prove that the employer intentionally discriminated to succeed in the large
proportion of disparate impact challenges to subjective decisionmaking. 67
Under the plurality's formulation, as in individual disparate treatment cases,
once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, almost any business-related
explanation for use of the challenged practices will suffice to meet the defen-
dant's burden of production.2 68 A trial court will have difficulty finding a
justification for not accepting, for example, evidence of an employer's desire
to select the best suited individual for the job based on the good faith exer-
cise of professional judgment as "evidence that its employment practices are
based on legitimate business reasons.
' 26 9
While Burdine refined the defendant's burden in individual treatment cases
by requiring that the articulated reason for the challenged action be stated
clearly and with reasonable specificity, 270 such a requirement will not likely
compel similar precision in a defendant's offer in cases challenging the
discriminatory impact of the use of subjectivity. The defendant's burden in
these cases is not focused on the reasons for taking a particular action, but
on the general justification for utilizing the challenged practices. All that is
required of a defendant by the plurality is evidence that the challenged prac-
tices are "based on legitimate business reasons."
Once the defendant's minimal burden is met, the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating pretext by showing that equally effective and less
discriminatory alternatives exist, or that the use of the challenged practices
is a cover-up for intentional discrimination.2 71 As a practical matter, however,
because the defendant is not required to demonstrate a positive relationship
between its practices and legitimate business needs, the plaintiff will seldom
267. In Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. Rsv. 419, 440
(1982), the author suggests that "the impetus toward merging disparate impact and disparate
treatment defenses is inevitable." Professor Furnish however, grounded her conclusion, in part,
on the notion that intent had already been made relevant in disparate impact cases. See supra
note 99 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 25.
269. 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
270. See supra note 26.
271. 108 S. Ct. at 2790. See also supra notes 79 & 80. The plurality here seems to recognize
the optional functions of evidence of alternatives at the pretext stage since it addresses factors
which are relevant in determining whether the alternatives identified are "equally as effective
as the challenged practices" (undermining the necessity of the practices) and whether "the challenged
practice has operated as the functional equivalent of a pretext for discriminatory treatment"
(raising an inference of intent). See supra note 99.
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be able to produce evidence of equally effective and less discriminatory alter-
native selection practices. Most jobs for which subjective selection devices serve
as a screen require an evaluation of candidate traits and job performance
standards that cannot be objectively measured."' As the plurality noted, "Some
qualities-for example common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition,
loyalty, and tact-cannot be measured accurately through standardized testing
techniques. Moreover, success at many jobs in which such qualities are crucial
cannot itself be measured directly." '273 With regard to such jobs there may
be many alternative selection practices, but without evidence of the effectiveness
of the challenged practices, it would be highly speculative to suggest that any
alternative is equally effective in meeting the employer's legitimate goals. The
plaintiff's practical burden at the pretext stage is to show that the process
used is a cover-up for intentional discrimination. The plurality's formulation
requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence of the discriminatory intent for which
the use of subjectivity is a cover-up and, therefore, renders the question of
the employer's intent critical in disparate impact cases.
Such a result is unnecessary in light of the evolution through which disparate
impact theory has gone since its initial adoption by the Court in Griggs.
Challenges to subjective selection devices under traditional disparate impact
theory do present analytical difficulties not generally encountered in cases
challenging clearly objective devices such as height and weight requirements
or written tests. Plaintiffs may find it difficult to identify the specific employ-
ment practices which are challenged and then to establish that they caused
the disparate impact observed.2 74 Defendants may find it difficult to meet
the burden of establishing a manifest relationship between the challenged prac-
tices and the employment in question.27- The Watson Court also noted con-
flicting policy considerations that must be taken into account. 276 The existence
272. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HAgv. L. Rev. 945, 984-985;
Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VII's Disparate Impact Theory,
U. ILL. L. REv. 869, 907 (1985); Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does Discriminatory
Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DEGo L. Rv. 63, 69-70 (1980).
273. 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
274. 108 S. Ct. at 2788-89.
275. Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar
and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 45, 117-18 (1979); Cooper, Women in the
Academy, 16 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 975, 992 (1983); Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level
Employment-A Response to Prof. Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 776, 789-92 (1983); B. ScHLBI
& P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYM ENT DISCRIINATION LAW 1289 (2d ed. 1983); Bartholet, supra note
275, at 984-98. The American Psychological Association, however, asserted as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner in Watson that validation of subjective systems is indeed possible. See
Brief for the American Psychological Association, at D-1, D-10 (Nov. 5, 1987).
276. 108 S. Ct. at 2786-87 (if disparate impact analysis is confined to objective tests, employers
will be able to substitute subjective criteria having substantially similar effects and Griggs will
become a dead letter); id. at 2787 (focus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue
pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures).
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of these complications however, does not justify the Watson plurality's aban-
donment of traditional disparate impact theory through redefinition.
An Appropriate Solution
While a number of commentators have proposed new solutions to the prob-
lems raised by challenges to subjective decisionmaking processes, this author
suggests that a return to traditional disparate impact analysis provides a suf-
ficient analytical framework for determining whether discrimination exists.
Traditional impact theory can accommodate the difficulties associated with
challenges to discretionary decisionmaking without unduly infringing upon
management prerogatives or undermining plaintiffs' ability to prove a case.
It has been suggested that subjective decisionmaking should be totally ex-
empted from disparate impact analysis. This suggestion is grounded in the
belief that the economic costs of validation and the interest in protecting
employer autonomy outweigh any benefit to be derived from applying impact
analysis in such cases.277 The suggestion is also grounded in the belief that
because subjective judgments are nothing more than "hunches," courts will
gain little insight on whether discrimination exists by second-guessing"' 8 those
judgments.
Professor Maltz suggests that the economic cost imposed on employers by
application of adverse impact theory in upper level jobs,279 coupled with an
interest in protecting employer autonomy, justify exempting all upper level
employment decisions from adverse impact analysis. 8 ' He admits, however,
that his calculation of cost "depends in large measure on the magnitude of
the validation costs and on the precise definition of business necessity...
respectively."2 8' Because the approach proposed here recognizes that adverse
impact theory does not require "validation" in all cases, but only a showing
of a broadly defined business necessity, the costs of validation anticipated
by Professor Maltz should not materialize. Maltz also factors into his cost
277. See Maltz, supra note 275, at 776.
278. See Lamber, supra note 272, at 873.
279. Professors Maltz, Bartholet, Lamber, Waintrob and Cooper all address the question of
the applicability of disparate impact theory in terms of the level of the job for which the subjec-
tive standard serves as a screen. Professor Bartholet provides an excellent discussion of the fact
that courts have shown a strong reluctance to find discrimination in upper level employment.
Bartholet, supra note 272, at 959-98. Maltz is in agreement with Professor Bartholet's analysis.
See Maltz, supra note 275, at 776. Unless one is willing to suggest that minorities and women
are less entitled to be free from discriminatory practices at the upper level than the lower however,
there is no basis for applying different modes of analysis depending on the level of the job
in question. Practices that can be proven to be discriminatory are no less so because they operate
at higher levels. The practical fact is that proof of discrimination may be difficult in many cases
challenging upper level employment decisions because of a lack of compelling statistical evidence
to establish impact, or a lack of direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The mere fact that
the level of the job in question may be high, however, should be of no consequence in determin-
ing whether unlawful discrimination exists.
280. Maltz, supra note 275, at 786-90.
281. Id. at 787.
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analysis the value of employer autonomy. 82 He recognizes, however, that
"[s]ince both the desire to alleviate institutional racism and the desire to
preserve employer autonomy originate in very basic concepts of justice,
disagreement regarding their relative importance simply is not subject to resolu-
tion through reasoned argument. ' 283 Fair application of disparate impact
analysis infringes on employer autonomy only where that autonomy results
in the exclusion of protected groups. Employer autonomy is not eroded by
a court that requires the employer to justify utilizing a practice that excludes
protected groups from employment opportunities. Professor Maltz's proposed
exemption from disparate impact theory for all upper level jobs is too broad
and too drastic in light of the broad purposes of Title VII.
Professor Lamber has also suggested an exemption for discretionary deci-
sionmaking. Her exemption is described as a "limited and principled"
deference to such decisionmaking. 21" Her approach would have the courts
"pierc[e] the discretionary veil" by distinguishing those employers who have
a "legitimate claim to discretion" and those who do not.2" She suggests several
factors are relevant in determining which discretionary decisionmaking systems
are legitimate and which are not. Those factors include whether the employer
is public or private, 86 whether the decisions are made within a hierarchy of
authority,2 17 the degree of risk of bias in the measurement or definition of
general standards, 288 and whether the job involves the exercise of considerable
discretion.
289
The apparent rationale for this limited exemption is that in situations where
the employer takes serious business risks by playing hunches, such as where
no one "knows what factors or characteristics predict success or how impor-
tant a particular characteristic is," discretionary decisions should be immune
from scrutiny because "courts will gain little from scrutinizing this employer's
judgment. 298 Application of disparate impact theory, however, does not re-
quire a court to second guess an employer's discretionary judgment. Rather,
it only requires that the court make a judgment regarding the business necessity
of a process of "playing hunches" that consistently excludes members of pro-
tected groups. If the employer is unable to persuade the court that its discre-
tionary process predicts success or is otherwise manifestly related to the employ-
ment in question, the force of its business necessity defense must be diminished.
Other factors that may mitigate in favor of the use of subjective decision-
making processes, of course, may be considered by the court in assessing a
282. Id. at 789.
283. Id. at 792.
284. Lamber, supra note 272, at 873.
285. Id. at 907.
286. Id. at 908.
287. Id. at 910.
288. Id. at 912.
289. Id. at 914.
290. Id. at 907.
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defendants claim of business necessity; but none should preclude a court from
making the inquiry.
Professor Blumrosen has offered yet another solution which includes an
exemption for certain employers from disparate impact analysis. His -proposed
exemption relates neither to the level of the job nor to the nature of the system,
but to the status of the employer in terms of its affirmative action record.
Professor Blumrosen suggests that disparate impact theory be applied to sub-
jective selection procedures only where the employer has "not participated
meaningfully in affirmative action." 2 9' This approach is designed to reward
employers who have hired minorities by forcing their employees to challenge
their subjective judgments under the disparate treatment mode.292 Blumrosen's
approach is inconsistent with the Teal holding that the bottom line is irrele-
vant in determining whether a particular selection device has an illegal adverse
impact on a protected individual. An employer's success in implementing af-
firmative action should not insulate those practices that have an adverse racial
effect.
2"1
Some proposals for revising the disparate treatment theory could, if adopted
by the courts, render it a more useful mechanism for analyzing discretionary
decisionmaking. 94 These approaches, however, like the Watson plurality's ap-
proach, constitute major changes in well-established substantive theories of
liability, and should be approached with some degree of caution.
Professor Bartholet suggests that impact theory be applied in all cases
challenging the use of subjective processes that cause a disparate impact. In
her view, employers should be required to prove that their subjective evalua-
tions were accurate or that the evaluation system was job related. 295 Bartholet's
approach is more consistent with Title VII theory than the other approaches
noted. The difficulty is that it places undue emphasis on the notion of technical
validation. Bartholet requires that employers "validate" discretionary systems
under traditional Title VII standards.29' She urges that the defendant establish
291. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 Cm.-
KENT L. Rav. 1, 32 (1987).
292. Id. at 33.
293. In light of the Watson plurality's fear that employers maybe pressured into adopting
unlawful quotas by application of traditional disparate impact analysis, it is unlikely that the
Court will ever adopt this approach. This carrot and stick approach may be useful as an ad-
ministrative mechanism for guiding an enforcement agency in the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion, but not as a rule of law.
294. See, e.g., Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAmi. L. REv. 1205 (1981); Cooper, Women in the Academy,
19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. at 1013 (1983).
295. Bartholet, supra note 272, at 1005.
296. Id. at 989. Bartholet argues for the imposition of a heavy burden of validation of subjec-
tive selection devices, although she recognizes that new undescribed validation techniques may
be required. Id. Technical "validation" of selection devices however, is not the only way in
which use of devices that produce a disparate impact may be justified. Validation is but one
method of demonstrating job relatedness, and job relatedness one component of business necessity.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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the "fundamental validity" of the discretionary process and not its "apparent
rationality or good faith."2 91 The difficulty with this approach is that "valida-
tion" under traditional Title VII standards may indeed be difficult,2 98 and
"validation" is normally associated with a demonstration of job relatedness.
Validation is not required if the employer can convince the court that the
use of the offending system is otherwise "manifestly related to the employ-
ment in question" as that concept was broadened by Davis and Beazer.
In Davis and Beazer, the Court began the expansion of the concept of
business necessity beyond the bounds initially established by Griggs and
Dothard. This broadening of the scope of the relationship established between
the challenged selection device and legitimate business concerns to demonstrate
business necessity recognizes not only that "validation" may not be required
in all cases to establish business necessity, but also that job relatedness is not
the only standard by which to measure a selection practice's manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question. This expansion of the business necessity
defense accommodates the difficulties associated with technical validation, and
allows the courts to judge the business necessity defense through a searching
evaluation of the employer's explanation for utilizing subjectivity. This analysis
could take into account those factors which the court determines may mitigate
in favor of the use of subjectivity. 99 It could take into account the "rationality"
of the process without deferring unduly to the employer's "good faith."" 0
By retaining an analytical model which places the burden of proving business
necessity on the defendant, courts will encourage the presentation of all relevent
evidence. By recognizing an expanded business necessity defense, courts will
retain the flexibility to evaluate all such evidence, making an informed deter-
mination possible regarding the utility of the challenged practices. By reducing
the defendant's burden of proof to one of production, however, the Watson
plurality has transformed traditional disparate impact analysis into what is,
for all practical purposes, a proxy for disparate treatment analysis. The plurality,
rather than requiring the defendant to justify its use of practices causing an
adverse impact, places the practical burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
challenged practices are a pretext for intentional discrimination.
Professor Maltz's approach places the discriminatory effects of subjective
decisionmaking beyond the reach of federal courts. Professor Lamber seeks
to exempt some discretionary systems from disparate impact challenge, but
those exempted are arguably most in need of scrutiny-those with no apparent
297. Id. at 967.
298. See supra note 275.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 289-92, for those factors viewed as important in the
view of Professor Lamber. All of these factors and more could be considered by the trial judge,
although the weight to be given each must be determined with care based on the relationship
of the factor to business concerns. The absence of alternative devices for example, may be a
significant factor while the extent to which the job requires the exercise of discretion may be
of very little significance.
300. Bartholet, supra note 272, at 967.
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justification. Professor Bartholet allows for challenges to the adverse effects
of discretionary systems, but imposes upon employers stringent validation stan-
dards that limit an employer's ability to justify its practices. Professor
Blumrosen also seeks to exempt certain systems from impact analysis, but
does so by incorporating into the analysis policy considerations unrelated to
the question of whether unlawful discrimination exists. The approach of the
Watson plurality, apparently prompted by those same policy considerations,
blurs the critical distinctions between the impact and treatment theories and
seriously undermines the viability of disparate impact theory as an effective
tool in such cases.
Traditional disparate impact theory, refined by defining with some precision
the meaning of "business necessity" in this context, can be applied by courts
to subjective decisionmaking systems in a manner that accommodates the unique
nature of the jobs involved and systems challenged, without imposing undue
burdens on employers. Employees can be spared the unnecessary and largely
impossible surrebuttal burden of establishing that the employers use of sub-
jectivity was a pretext for intentional discrimination. Employers can be spared
the expense of formal validation through fair application of the already ex-
panded concept of "business necessity."
Admittedly, this approach leaves much to the discretion of the courts, and
may be criticized both for its laxity in eliminating discrimination in high level
and academic positions, and for its arguably inappropriate insertion of federal
judges into the affairs of business. This approach, however, maintains the
balance already struck by Title VII between society's interests in non-
discrimination nd employer autonomy without significantly and artifically
altering the sound analytical models already in place.
On June 5, 1989, the Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.10 '
In Wards Cove, the Watson plurality was joined by Justice Kennedy, and, in an
opinion authored by Justice White, the Court confirmed the trend set in Wat-
son. On the question of the appropriate statistical analysis for establishing
plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact, the Court, not unexpectedly, 30 2
found that an analysis comparing the percentages of blacks and whites in
different segments of the existing workforce was nonsensical where one seg-
ment did not reflect the pool of qualified applicants for the other.11 Having
found that the statistical analysis offered was insufficient to establish a prima
facie case, the Court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether
a prima facie case had otherwise been made.3 0 4 The Court went on to address
the other issues raised.
The Court expressly adopted the Watson requirement that plaintiff iden-
tify the specific employment practice being challenged and show that it is the
301. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
302. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
303. 109 S. Ct. at 2121, 2123.
304. Id. at 2123-24.
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cause of the statistical disparity observed."' The Court shed little light,
however, on the propriety of a plaintiff's challenge to the combined effects
of a number of employment practices210 The Court noted "[a]s a general
matter" that a plaintiff must demonstrate a nexus between a "specific or par-
ticular employment practice" and the disparate impact shown.101 It also stated
that plaintiffs must "demonstrate that the disparity they complain of is the
result or one or more of the employment practices they are attacking." 310
This language might suggest that the Court is willing to consider the combin-
ed effects of a number of employment practices, but for the fact it is im-
mediately followed by language seeming to require the plantiff show "that
each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact." 3 °9 Although
the dissenting Justices read the majority to the contrary,31° the Court has yet
to state clearly that the combined effects of multiple employment practices
may not be challenged under disparate-impact theory.31'
As to the defendant's burden after the prima facie case is made, the Court
observed that while "some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting
otherwise ... to the extent that those cases speak of an employer's 'burden
of proof' . . . they should have been understood to mean an employer's pro-
duction - but not persuasion - burden., 312 Mirroring the test established
in Watson,313 the Court stated that "[iun this phase the employer carries the
burden of producing evidence of a business justification for his employment
practice.314 Indicative of the trend toward a merger of the two theories predicted
by Profesor Furnish 31 5 is the Court's statement that "[tihis rule ... conforms
to the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden
of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or
practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration." ' 31'
Finally, the Court addressed the pretext stage of disparate impact litiga-
tion. In this section of the opinion, the Court recognized a plaintiff's oppor-
305. Id. at 2124.
306. See supra notes 239-240.
307. 109 St. Ct. at 2124.
308. Id. at 2125 (emphasis added).
309. Id. Thus, this opinion may be read to suggest that: (1) plaintiff may only challenge in-
dividual employment practices; (2) plaintiff may challenge the combined effect of a number of
practices; or (3) plaintiff may only challenge the combined effect of a number of practices where
each of the practices challenged has a significantly disparate impact.
310. Id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("it requires
practice-by-practice statistical proof").
311. Clarification of this issue must await another day. On June 12, 1989 in USX Corp. v.
Green, 109 S. Ct. 3151 (1989), the Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded in light of
its decision in Atonio. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that the combined
effects of a number of practices were subject to challenge under the disparate impact theory.
See supra note 54.
312. 109 S. Ct. at 2126. See, however, supra note 78.
313. 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
314. 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
315. See supra note 267.
316. 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
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tunity to prevail even if a defendant meets its burden of production, by
demonstrating that other selection devices without a similarly disparate result
would also serve the employer's legitimate interests.317 The Court, however,
seems to abandon the recognition in Watson of the two optional func-
tions the evidence offered at this pretext stage, 318 and asserts that the employer's
"refusa[l] to adopt these alternatives ... would belie a claim by [the employer]
that [its] incumbent practices are being employed for nondiscriminatory
reasons. '"3 " This rationale further obscures the traditional distinction between
disparate impact and treatment theories.
Justice Stevens joined the Watson dissenters, 320 and authored a dissenting
opinion charging the majority, inter alia, with abandoning in a "casual -
almost summary ' 32' fashion the longstanding rule developed since Griggs that
the employer in disparate impact cases has the burden of proving the "affir-
mative defense ' 32 2 of business necessity.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Brennan and Marshall, wrote separately con-
curring in Justice Steven's dissent, accusing the majority of "upsetting the
longstanding distribution of burdens of proof in Title VII disparate-impact
cases," and wondering "whether the majority still believes that race discrimina-
tion ... is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.
' 323
Conclusion
Disparate impact and disparate treatment are distinct theories, and each
is equally a part of Title VII case law. Courts have used both theories effectively
to combat employment discrimination. The abandonment of one should not
be undertaken without sound reasons. No such reasons are provided by the
plurality opinion in Watson or Wards Cove. Griggs established that Title VII's
prohibition was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing both overt
discrimination and practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in opera-
tion. Disparate impact theory, as formulated in Griggs and refined in Beazer,
balances the disparate impact of employment practices against the interest
in protecting business autonomy by allowing for a business necessity defense.
The business necessity defense allows for business autonomy to the extent
that such autonomy does not result in the "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers ' 30 6 to employment that Congress intended Title VII to remove.
317. Id.
318. See supra note 271.
319. 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
320. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun.
321. 109 S. Ct. at 2132.
322. Id. at 2131.
323. Id. at 2136.
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